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the Excluded Child 
MARY KATE KEARNEY* 
This Article questions whether parents have a right to 
corporally punish their children, and, if they do, how this right 
should be de.fined. Although several possible sources of a substan-
tive due process right of parental corporal punishment exist, it is 
clear that parents do not need the heightened constitutional 
protection afforded by a fundamental right. This is so because the 
political process already adequately protects the interests of parents 
in disciplining their children. To the extent that the political 
process chooses to permit parents to administer reasonable corporal 
punishment, this Article proposes a five-part test that courts can use 
to determine whether an act of corporal punishment fits within that 
reasonableness standard. This test is more sensitive to the interests 
of children than are current standards and resolves all doubts in 
favor of the children. 
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The parental use of corporal punishment1 is common but controver-
sial. 2 When parents administer corporal punishment, the practice raises 
a host of legal issues. Those issues play out against a societal backdrop 
of heightened sensitivity to state intrusion into family privacy on the one 
hand3 and increased awareness of child abuse on the other.4 The legal 
issues involving the parental use of corporal punishment implicate two 
sets of concerns: courts must determine whether parents have a 
fundamental right to use corporal punishment and, if they do, how far 
that right extends. 
1. Traditionally, and for the purposes of this Article, corporal punishment 
involves the intentional infliction of physical force upon a child. See, e.g., low A CODE 
§ 234.40 (1994) ("intentional physical punishment ofa ... child"); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 
§ 1012 (McKinney 1995) ("intentional[] ... serious injury to a child"); see also MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1312(1) (West 1994) ("deliberate infliction of physical pain 
by hitting, paddling, spanking, slapping, or any other physical force used as a means of 
discipline"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.45(1) (West 1994) ("hitting or spanking a person 
with or without an object; or ... unreasonable physical force that causes bodily harm 
or substantial emotional harm"); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 15-47-47 (1993) ("willful infliction 
of, willfully causing the infliction of, or willfully allowing the infliction of physical pain 
on a pupil"). 
2. See Spare the Rod? Mother Arrested for Slapping Child, Chi. TRIB., July 1, 
1994, § 1, at 7 (discussing controversy surrounding felony charges .brought against a 
mother who slapped her nine-year-old son in a grocery store). As of the writing of this 
Article, charges are still pending against the mother. 
3. For example, two recent state supreme court decisions awarding biological 
parents custody of their children after the children had been living with their adoptive 
parents have received widespread attention. See In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 
(III. 1994); In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). 
4. For example, one newspaper's year-long investigation into the deaths of 
children in its community found that one leading cause of death was abuse by parents 
or a boyfriend of the child's mother. See Steve Johnson, Killing Our Children, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 1, 1993, § 1, at 1. 
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This Article addresses both of those issues. The Article first 
concludes that parents who use corporal punishment should not receive 
the heightened protection conferred by a fundamental right because their 
interests are already adequately safeguarded by the political process. 
Second, to the extent that the political process chooses to perm.it parents 
to administer reasonable corporal punishment, courts should abandon the 
current test which defines the scope of that reasonableness and adopt the 
test proposed by this Article because it is sensitive to the interests of 
those m.ost in need of protection under this right: children. 
Part II of this Article considers the status of the parental right of 
corporal punishment and concludes that it should not be considered a 
fundamental right. If the Supreme Court recognized this practice as a 
fundamental, parental right, then the state could not restrict its use unless 
it had a compelling reason for doing so. The question of how something 
becomes a fundamental right has occupied the Court's and 
com.m.entators' attention for years. Part II of this Article is divided into 
four sections, and each section considers a different potential source of 
a fundamental, parental right. 
The Court first turns to its past opinions on the subject.5 No Supreme 
Court case has raised the issue of whether parents have a fundamental 
right to corporally punish their children. Those cases which recognize 
a fundamental, parental right to direct the upbringing of their children 
are silent on whether that right includes the right of corporal punish-
m.ent.6 In a different context, the Court affirmed the right of schools to 
administer reasonable corporal punishment to their students without 
violating either the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth 
Am.endm.ent or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am.endm.ent.7 
These cases, however, do not answer the question of whether parents 
have a fundamental right of corporal punishment, and thus, the Court 
cannot rely on them. alone as a basis for such a right. 
The second source considered in establishing a fundamental right is 
located in history and tradition.8 History and tradition have been 
criticized as a source of fundamental rights because of difficulties both 
5. See discussion infra part II.A. 
6. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of the 
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
7. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977). 
8. See discussion infra part II.B. 
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in determining what constitutes a tradition and in using tradition to 
protect the interests of minorities.9 The Supreme Court's debate in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 10 about the use of history and tradition to 
establish fundamental rights underscores the problems with relying on 
that source. In that case, Justices Scalia's and Brennan's differing 
readings of history and tradition prevented them from reaching a 
consensus about whose interests were protected by a fundamental 
right. 11 A similar debate forecloses any consensus about whether 
history and tradition can serve to establish a fundamental right of 
parental corporal punishment. 
A third source of fundamental rights, contemporary norms or the 
"evolving standards of decency,"12 raises similar problems to those 
presented by using history and tradition as a source of fundamental 
rights. 13 The evolving standards of decency are perhaps more difficult 
to define than any other source of fundamental rights. The definitional 
problems involve figuring out whether those standards can be derived 
from a common experience, whether they can be pinpointed in time, and 
whether courts are equipped to define them. 14 These three concerns 
effectively prevent the evolving standards of decency from acting as a 
basis for establishing a fundamental right of corporal punishment. 
The last section of Part II concludes that the political process 
adequately protects parents' interests in using corporal punishment. 15 
The public has signaled its approval of corporal punishment through 
legislation which allows parents to administer reasonable corporal 
punishment. Even if that ability is threatened, parents can use the 
political process to protect their interests. As adults, parents have the 
right to vote, and they can exercise that right to change laws that they 
feel unduly limit their ability to administer corporal punishment. 
Because the majoritarian process safeguards parents' interests, they do 
not need the additional, constitutional protection of a fundamental right 
of corporal punishment. Fundamental rights should protect minority 
interests, and parents who use corporal punishment do not fall into that 
category. 
9. John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. 
L. REV. 5, 29-33 (1978). 
10. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
11. Compare id. at 124-25 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), with id. at 139-40 
(Brennan, ·J., dissenting). 
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
13. See discussion infra part II.C. 
14. See Ely, supra note 9, at 43-52. 
15. See discussion infra part II.D. 
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Given the fact that the majoritarian process protects parents' interest 
in reasonable corporal punishment, this Article also considers the 
question of what constitutes reasonable corporal punishment. Part III 
evaluates the current test for determining the reasonableness of parental 
corporal punishment, explains its deficiencies, and proposes a new test. 
Under the current test, courts consider the parents' intent in administer-
ing the corporal punishment, the nature of the force, and the surrounding 
circumstances. 16 Courts will balance these factors to determine 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the parents' conduct 
was reasonable. 
This test is flawed in two respects. First, this test will not enable 
courts to reach a consensus about the parameters of reasonable corporal 
punishment. Because the test is subject to differing interpretations, 
parents cannot rely on it to guide their behavior. Second, and more 
importantly, children cannot rely on this test to protect them from 
physical abuse. The test preserves the interests of parents--a powerful 
political group-at the expense of children-a politically isolated 
minority The test ignores children, the group of people whose interests 
are most affected by the parameters of the standard, and allows parents, 
who may be motivated by self-interest, to set the limits on it. Therefore, 
this test achieves the opposite of its intended effect: it protects the 
interests of a powerful majority to the detriment of an isolated minority. 
Children's interests were already ignored when the parental ability to use 
reasonable corporal punishment was established through the political 
process; they should not be overlooked for a second time as the 
parameters of the right are determined. 
This Article proposes a test for reasonableness that is more sensitive 
to the interests of children. This new test evaluates the reasonableness 
of parents' use of force with a series of five questions. These questions 
require courts to review a parent's decision to use corporal punishment 
by asking: (1) What was the parent's intent in administering the corporal 
punishment? (2) To what was the parent responding? (3) What did the 
parent do? (4) Could the corporal punishment have worked? (5) Did the 
parent have any alternatives? The questions are interrelated, so, for 
example, the milder the child's misconduct, the less tolerant a court 
should be of parental use of corporal punishment. Because the questions 
16. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.08 (l)(a), (b) (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 147(1) (1965). 
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are interrelated, they give a court some discretion in weighing and 
evaluating them. Nevertheless, the standard also is clear in refusing to 
tolerate certain uses of parental force regardless of the provocation or 
any other circumstances. Some levels of force are so excessive or so 
misintended that they are clearly outside the boundaries of what society 
tolerates,. and there is no room for judicial discretion in balancing that 
force against any of the other factors. 
This new test better protects the interests of children. Even though 
courts balance parents' and children's interests under both tests, the new 
test requires courts to resolve all doubts in favor of the child. The new 
test safeguards children's interests by holding parents to a higher level 
of behavior. Most significantly, this test requires parents to have 
exhausted other available alternatives before resorting to physical force. 
In so doing, corporal punishment represents a last measure that parents 
can use only after other means of discipline and education have been 
tried and have failed. 
This requirement, however, does not always work against a parent's 
decision to use force. Parents who administer corporal punishment after 
they have exhausted all available alternatives may be protected under 
this standard. In one situation, the parental use of corporal punishment 
was justified because the state had deprived the family of any alterna-
tives.17 The state needs to ensure that parents have effective ways, 
other than corporal punishment, that help them to educate and discipline 
their children. If the state fails to provide alternatives, such as services 
and programs, then it should not be able to intervene and take away 
parents' rights of corporal punishment. Thus, the requirement that less 
restrictive alternatives .be considered before corporal punishment is 
imposed is attentive to the interests of parents but focuses on the need 
of children to be kept safe from harm. 
This Article concludes that the Supreme Court does not need to 
recognize a fundamental right of parents to corporally punish their 
children. If the majority of people determines that parents should be 
able to use corporal punishment, then the political process can adequate-
ly protect that consensus. Given the legislative recognition of parents' 
ability to administer reasonable corporal punishment, parents should not 
be able to secure additional judicial protection· for their interests. 
Instead, that judicial protection should be reserved for those who lack a 
voice in the political process: children. Therefore, the courts should 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 23 7-45 ( discussing a situation where 
parents chained their drug-addicted daughter to a radiator in their home after the state 
ignored their pleas for assistance in dealing with her). 
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abandon the current test for defining the scope of the parental right and 
should adopt the test proposed in this Article. While the current test 
preserves parents' interests at the expense of children's rights, the new 
test is sensitive to the needs of children and safeguards their interests. 
IL POTENTIAL SOURCES OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT 
The Supreme Court has recognized certain interests as fundamental 
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 
Some interests are considered· fundamental rights because they are 
specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights/9 while other interests not 
enumerated in the Constitution may still be considered fundamental 
rights.20 Interests in this latter group can become fundamental rights 
when they are so important to an individual's liberty that the Court 
wants to protect these interests from unjustified state intrusion.21 
The importance of recognizing certain unenumerated rights as 
fundamental lies in the increased level of protection accorded those 
rights. Typically, the state can infringe on a non-fundamental right if it 
18. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)(overturning a state-law 
restricting access to marriage and rioting that the right to marry is of "fundamental 
importance"); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding 
that the right to vote in state elections may not be burdened by the imposition of a state 
poll tax); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a state law 
banning the use of contraceptives as violative of the right of marital privacy). 
19. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (recognizing that the 
notion of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the freedom of 
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 
(1931) (recognizing that the notion of liberty under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of free speech guaranteed by the First 
Amendment). 
20. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (recognizing that fundamental rights may 
be found in the "penumbras" of the Constitution). 
21. One of the most well-known instances of the Court's elevating an individual's 
liberty interest to the level of a fundamental right can be found in Griswold, where the 
Court affirmed a fundamental right to privacy when it determined that a law prohibiting 
the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally infringed on a "relationship lying within the 
zone of privacy." Id. at 485. Although the Court did not define the parameters of this 
right to privacy, it endorsed the idea that a fundamental right could be located in the 
"penumbras," not the text, of the .Constitution. Id, at 484; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438,453 (1972) (discussing the right to privacy as "the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"). 
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has a rational basis for doing so. Furthermore, the state can pass a law 
restricting a non-fundamental right as long as that law is "rationally 
related to a legitimate end of government."22 In contrast, the state 
usually cannot interfere with a fundamental right unless it has a 
compelling reason for doing so.23 In those cases, the Court will use a 
"strict scrutiny" approach to determine whether such an overwhelming 
or compelling need exists.24 This additional burden on the state to 
justify its regulation of fundamental, as opposed to non-fundamental, 
rights means that securing fundamental rights status may be critical to 
preserving a particular interest.25 
The Supreme Court can consult a variety of sources to determine 
whether an interest deserves heightened constitutional protection, and 
thus, fundamental right status.26 The Court may first review its past 
decisions to see how it has treated this interest, and may then look to 
history, tradition, and contemporary social norms or evolving standards 
of decency27 for additional guidance. The next three sections consider 
whether these sources provide the Court with a basis for identifying and 
defining a fundamental, parental right of corporal punishment. 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
It is now well-settled law that the Court recognizes certain aspects of 
the parent-child relationship as falling within the category of 
unenumerated, fundamental rights.28 To understand the Court's 
perspective on the status of parents' rights as fundamental, one must 
examine a line of Supreme Court cases dating back over seventy years. 
In these cases, the Court recognized the fundamental right of parents to 
direct the upbringing of their children and included within that right the 
parental ability to make religious and educational choices for their 
offspring.29 The Court further observed that this right was not absolute 
when it came into conflict with the state's interest in safeguarding the 
22. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 379 (4th 
ed. 1991). 
23. Id. at 574-75. 
24. Id. at 575. 
25. Id. at 388. 
26. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 9, at 16-51 (discussing possible sources the Court 
may use to identify fundamental rights). 
27. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1957). 
28. See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Francis B. 
McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. 
L. REV. 975,985 (1988) (noting the status of parents' rights as fundamental rights). 
29. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
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welfare of children.30 The Court, however, has been silent about 
whether the use of corporal punishment is considered part of this 
fundamental, parental right, and if so, how far the parentalright extends. 
In two decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of parents to 
make educational choices for their children. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the 
Court struck down a state law that prohibited the teaching of any 
language but English to children in grade school.31 In making this 
determination, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause protects such 
liberty interests as "the right of the individual ... to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children."32 The parental right to bring up children 
carries a corresponding duty to educate them, and parents therefore have 
a liberty interest in choosing the kind of education that their children 
receive.33 
Two years after Meyer, the Supreme Court determined that a state 
compulsory education law requiring parents to send children of certain 
ages only to public schools violated the Due Process Clause.34 In 
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 
the Court noted that Meyer stood for the proposition that parents have 
a liberty interest in "direct[ing] the upbringing and education of children 
under their control."35 According to the Court, the parental interest 
extended to the "right ... [and] duty, to recognize and prepare [children] 
for additional obligations."36 In Pierce, that right gave parents -the 
authority to select the kind of school that their children would attend.37 
In Meyer and Pierce, the Court .upheld the fundamental right of 
parents to direct the upbringing of their children, at least in the context 
30. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
31. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. 
32. Id. at 399. In dicta, the Court contrasted the role that parents play in 
American society to their role in ancient Greece. In American society, parents have the 
responsibility for directing their children's education while the state had that authority 
in ancient Greece. American society gives parents this authority over their children 
because it values the role of the individual more highly than ancient Greece did. Thus, 
the American legal system protects parental autonomy in making child-rearing decisions. 
Id. at 401-02. 
33. Id. at 400. 
34. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
35.- Id. 
36. Id. at 535. 
37. Id. 
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of making educational choices. Although the Court acknowledged the 
state's interest in promoting the health and welfare of its citizens,38 it 
determined that the parents' interests should prevail in those cases. 
Twenty years later, under different circumstances, the Supreme Court 
returned to this balancing test when considering the parental right to 
make child-rearing decisions against the state's interest in protecting the 
health, welfare, and safety of children. This time, however, in Prince v. 
Massachusetts,39 the Court found the balance to favor the state and 
upheld the constitutionality of a state child labor law that prohibited 
children from selling newspapers in public places.40 The constitutional-
ity of the statute was challenged by a nine-year-old girl and her guardian 
who were distributing religious literature on the street during the 
evening. They claimed that the statute violated the child's First 
Amendment right to exercise her religion and the guardian's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to "bring up the child in the way [she] should go, 
which . . . means to teach [her] the tenets and the practices of their 
faith."41 Thus, the right of a parental figure to direct the religious 
upbringing of a child was at stake in Prince. The Court determined that 
this right was subject to certain state restrictions regarding the welfare 
of children.42 
In examining the guardian's rights, the Court noted the difficulty of 
balancing the interests between parent and state, especially when the 
state is seeking to regulate how a family practices its religion.43 The 
Court cited Meyer and Pierce for the proposition that there exists a 
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."44 The Court 
recognized that parents have primary authority within this private realm 
to make child-rearing decisions about their children: "It is cardinal with 
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
38. The Court acknowledged the role of the state in Meyer and Pierce, but it 
concluded that the parents' rights were preeminent. The Court reasoned "[t]hat the State 
may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, 
physically, mentally and morally ... but the individual has certain fundamental rights 
which must be respected." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). Similarly, 
the Court noted that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture 
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
39. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
40. Id. at 170-71. 
41. Id. at 164. 
42. Id. at 167. 
43. Id. at 165. 
44. Id. at 166. 
10 
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obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.',45 Their authority, 
however, does not give parents exclusive control over their children's 
upbringing. When parents exert control in a way that jeopardizes a 
child's health, safety, or welfare, the state can use its parens patriae 
power to intervene in the parent-child relationship to protect the child.46 
In Prince, the Court expressed concern about the adverse effects of 
child employment, particularly in public places,· and the accompanying 
dangers of being on the street.47 The Court concluded that the state 
had the authority to protect children from these dangers by banning them 
from street preaching, although parents retained the right to make other 
decisions about their children's religious training.48 Thus, the Court 
weighed the interests of the parents against those of the state and 
decided that under those circumstances, the state could limit the parental 
right to direct the religious upbringing of the child. 
Thirty years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder,49 the Supreme Court 
balanced those interests in favor of the parents when it affirmed their 
right to direct the religious upbringing of their children.50 The Court 
considered the interests of a group of Amish parents who argued that 
they should not be required to send their children to school beyond the 
eighth grade even though state law required children under the age of 
sixteen to be enrolled in school.51 Citing its decisions in Meyer, 
Pierce, and Prince, the Court weighed "the traditional interest of parents 
with respect to the religious upbringing of their children"52 against the 
state's interests in compulsory education and child labor laws.53 In 
balancing those interests, the Court concluded that the Amish parents 
were not jeopardizing the welfare of their children by withdrawing them 
from school after the eighth grade. 54 Instead, they were properly 
asserting their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to exercise their 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 168. 
48. Id. at 171. 
49. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
50. Id. at 231-32 (upholding the "fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted 
with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children"). 
51. Id. at 207-09. 
52. Id. at 214. 
53. Id. at 214-15, 228-29. 
54. Id. at 234. 
11 
religion and to '"prepare [their children] for additional obligations"' by 
directing their religious upbringing.55 
In Meyer, Pierce, Prince, and Yoder, the Court endorsed the funda-
mental right of parents to direct the religious and educational upbringing 
of their children, but it did not define the scope of that right. These 
cases can be read narrowly to mean that the Court limited the parents' 
rights to making only educational and religious choices for their 
children. The debate in Meyer and Pierce focused on the parents' roles 
in determining how and where their children should be taught, and the 
discussion in Prince and Yoder addressed the parents' ability to direct 
the religious upbringing of their children. Therefore, the Court may 
have conferred a fundamental right on parents but confined their 
authority to making only certain kinds· of decisions. 
These cases also could be read more broadly to include the use of 
corporal punishment within the scope of parents' fundamental rights.56 
The Court did not specifically limit the constitutional protection of 
parental decisionmaking authority to choices about schooling and. 
religious practices. In subsequent opinions, the Court cited these cases 
for the principle of "traditional parental authority in matters of child 
rearing and education"57 and the right to "raise one's children."58 
These later cases arose when the Court was analyzing the substantive 
due process rights of a grandmother who challenged a zoning ordinance 
that defined family narrowly to exclude her relationship with her 
grandsons59 and the rights of an unwed father who requested a hearing 
before his parental rights were terminated.60 Thus, although the cases 
still do not touch on corporal punishment, their language about the 
parental right to direct the upbringing of one's children may supply the 
underpinnings of a parental right of corporal punishment.61 The 
55. Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)). 
56. See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: 
Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 37 (1994) (arguing that 
"[t]he law characterizes the parent's right to punish a child as constitutional because the 
right resides in a parent's broad constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of 
[their] children"). 
57. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality 
opinion) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Pierce v. Society of 
the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923)). 
58. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
59. Moore, 431 U.S. at 495-97. 
60. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649. 
61. The authors of one article noted that the line of cases from Meyer to Yoder 
addressed situations in which the interests of parents and children are united and are in 
12 
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Supreme Court, however, has never decided a case in which it consid-
ered whether the parental use of corporal punishment fell within the 
scope of the fundamental right of parents to direct their children's 
upbringing. We must look then to cases in which the Court addressed 
the constitutionality of corporal punishment of children in other factual 
contexts.62 
. In Ingraham v. Wright,63 the Court determined that corporal punish-
ment could be used to discipline children in public schools without 
violating either the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 64 
Although the Ingraham Court did not decide the case on substantive due 
process grounds, the Court noted that in early school corporal punish-
opposition to the state's interests. See Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The Liberty 
Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their Application, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 170 
(1978). In those situations, the parents should have more authority than the state to 
decide how a child should be raised. The authors maintain that parental control over 
children even extends to the parents' use of physical force on the children as a way of 
preserving family harmony. Id. at 171. The authors suggest that perhaps this parental 
use of discipline should be constitutionally protected but caution that it must only be 
used to unite, rather than to disrupt, the family. Id. at 171-72; see also Fitzgerald, supra 
note 56 (classifying parents' right to punish their children as constitutional). 
Teitelbaum and Ellis are careful to distinguish the use of parental control in those 
situations where the parents and children have the same interests from those cases in 
which parents' and children's interests are in conflict. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra,: at 
168-69. When parents' and children's interests compete, courts must be careful not to 
protect the parental interest at the expense of the children's rights. According to the 
authors, the constitutional recognition of a parental right of control in the latter situation 
would "create[] a sphere of personal domination which ... resembles the relationship 
of the early Roman father over his children." Id. at 168. Furthermore, judicial approval 
of a parental right of control would undermine a child's right of self-determination, and 
thus, must be avoided. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. 
Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd without opinion, 423 U.S. 907 (1975). In Baker, the court 
considered whether a parent's right to determine disciplinary measures for her son fell 
within the parental right to provide for a child's "'custody, care and nurture'" as 
established in Prince. Id. at 298 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944)). The case arose when the mother and child challenged the school's decision to 
administer corporal punishment to the child against his mother's wishes. Id. at 296. The 
court concluded that the mother's right to oppose the corporal punishment of her child 
is not fundamental and that the state therefore need not show a compelling interest 
before imposing that punishment. Id. at 299. Although the court acknowledged that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected "the right of parents generally to control means of 
discipline of their children," it balanced that interest against the state's "countervailing 
interest in the maintenance of order in the schools." Id. at 296. 
63. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
64. Id. 
13 
ment cases, the authority to use corporal punishment was delegated from 
parent to school. Today, the Court recognized that the teacher's 
authority is derived from the state's power under compulsory education 
laws to administer corporal punishment '"for the proper education of the 
child and for the maintenance of group discipline. "'65 The Court 
weighed the state's interests in discipline and education against a child's 
"right to be free from ... unjustified intrusions on personal security," 
which was part of the "historic liberties"66 protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The Court concluded that reasonable corporal punishment in school 
was "justifiable" because the state had a parens patriae interest in 
balancing "the child's ·interest· in personal security and the traditional 
view that some limited corporal punishment may be necessary in the 
course of a child's education.''67 In affirming this right of reasonable 
corporal punishment in public schools under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the Ingraham Court left open the issues of whether the 
Due Process Clause protects a fundamental, parental right of corporal 
punishment, and if so, how far that right extends. Thus, the legacy of 
Ingraham is that the democratic process is free to accept reasonable 
corporal punishment but is not required to tolerate it. 
In sum, Supreme Court cases have recognized the fundamental right 
of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. This precedent does 
not specifically include corporal punishment as part of that right, nor 
does it define the scope of reasonable corporal punishment. Therefore, 
we have to look to other sources to determine if and how corporal 
punishment is part of that fundamental right. We can turn to history and 
tradition and to the evolving standards of decency to consider the status 
of corporal punishment as a fundamental right. 
B. History and Tradition 
The Supreme Court has used history and tradition as a source for 
identifying and defining fundamental rights.68 The Court observed 
65. Id. at 662 (quoting 1 FOWLER, V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 3.20 (1956)). 
66. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673. 
67. Id at 676. 
68. History and tradition have replaced natural law as a source for fundamental 
rights under substantive due process. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 22, at 388-
91; see also Ely, supra note 9, at 22-32.(discussing the historical use of natural law in 
interpreting the Constitution); McCarthy, supra note 28, at 983-84 (chronicling the shift 
from natural law to tradition as a source of fundamental rights). 
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generally in Snyder v. Massachusetts69 that it could establish a funda-
mental right by relying on "some principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal. "70 More specific to our purposes, the Court has relied on history 
and tradition when defining the parameters of substantive due process in 
matters involving the family: "Our decisions establish that the Constitu-
tion protects the sanctity of the. family precisely because the institution 
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."71 
This appeal to history and tradition as a source of fundamental rights has 
been debated by commentators72 and the Supreme Court.73 
Commentators who favor the use of history and tradition to establish 
fundamental rights often advance two reasons in support of their 
position.74 First, they maintain that history and tradition enable the 
Court to give fundamental rights status to interests that society has 
already agreed deserve protection.75 Over time, some principles will 
be rejected while others take root. Those principles that have withstood 
the test of time become traditions that reflect a societal consensus about 
69. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
70. Id. at 105. 
71. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality 
opinion); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (noting that parents' 
"fundamental interest" in guiding their children's religious upbringing is reflected in the 
"history and culture of Western civilization")i Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (asserting that the Court should consult the 
'"traditions and [collective] conscience"' of the country as a source of establishing 
fundamental rights) .(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
72. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 9, at 39-43 (1978) (discussing the indeterminate and 
undemocratic nature of tradition as a source for fundamental rights); Rebecca L. Brown, 
Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 181-82 (1993) (defining tradition as a societal 
judgment based on values and aspirations and discussing the effect that traditions have 
on constitutional interpretation). But see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1043-47 (1979) (addressing Professor 
Ely's criticisms of the use of history and tradition as a basis for recognizing fundamental 
rights); Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1156, 1186-87 (1980) [hereinafter Developments] (discussing the value of a 
tradition-based approach to establishing a fundamental right). 
73. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (plurality opinion); Moore, 431 U.S. at 494. 
74. Developments, supra note 72, at 1186-87; see also Lupu, supra note 72, at 
1043-47 (discussing the "many ways in which history demonstrates recognition of a 
liberty as fundamental.") Id. at 1044. 
75. Developments, supra note 72, at 1186. 
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what interests should be preserved.76 For example, the principle of 
family autonomy has been established over time, and thus, has become 
an enduring tradition. As this tradition has taken root, people expect the 
Court to protect it. Therefore, when the Court recognizes family privacy 
as a fundamental right, it is simply giving constitutional protection to a 
principle that history and tradition already have carved out and upon 
which there is societal consensus. 77 
Second, these commentators contend that history and tradition 
represent neutral principles on which to ground fundamental rights.78 
The principles are neutral because the Court is consulting external 
authority when it recognizes a fundamental right rather than relying on 
the subjective beliefs of its members. Members of the Court can avoid 
imposing their own beliefs, or legislating from the bench, when they tum 
to "a relatively objective history" as a source of fundamental rights.79 
According to at least one commentator, this reliance on tradition will 
check the Court's authority by ensuring that societal consensus supports 
judicial recognition of a fundamental right. 80 
Critics, such as Professor Ely, of using history and tradition as a basis 
for fundamental rights raise two objections.81 First, Professor Ely 
points to various problems with defining a tradition.82 Those 
definitional problems include locating a tradition geographically and 
temporally, deciding when something is established enough to become 
76. But see Brown, supra note 72, at 182. The author rejects time as an essential 
element of establishing a tradition. The author argues that she does not endorse the 
more common definitions of tradition "because they presuppose that the practice at issue 
has withstood the test of time. For my purposes, the longevity of a practice is not 
decisive." Id. 
77. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 500•06 (noting that history and tradition protect 
the extended family); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (noting that limits on substantive due process protection come from "respect 
for the teachings of history [ and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our 
society") (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)). 
78. Developments, supra note 72, at 1187. 
79. Id. 
80. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 72, at 191-92 (discussing the rationale behind 
the "common consent" theory). Brown explains that "evidence of longstanding acts of 
government is relevant to a constitutional analysis to the extent that such evidence 
suggests that those acts are legitimate because of the common consent to their 
continuation." Id. at 192. 
81. Ely, supra note 9, at 39-43. 
82. Id. at 39; see also Brown, supra note 72, at 181-82. Brown offers several 
definitions for tradition, including: "'a continuing pattern of culture beliefs or practices,"' 
along with "'a long-established or inherited way of thinking or acting' or 'the handing 
down of statements, beliefs, legends, customs, information, etc., from generation to 
generation."' Id. (quoting THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 2006 (2d ed. 1987)). 
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a tradition, determining who defines a tradition, and figuring out what 
history has to say about creating a particular tradition. 83 These 
ambiguities in defining a tradition put the Court in the position of having 
"to admit that tradition does not really generate an answer."84 The 
Court, therefore, must look elsewhere to determine what constitutes a 
fundamental right. . 
Second, Professor Ely criticizes the "undemocratic nature" of using the 
interests of past generations to establish a fundamental right today. 85 
A tradition for him is something that has withstood the test of time but 
may also be frozen in time. He is reluctant to have the Court establish 
a right based on a tradition that may be outdated and ignore contempo-
rary societal beliefs.86 In addition, Professor Ely contends that judicial 
reliance on tradition is undemocratic because courts will be protecting 
the beliefs of the majority at the expense of minority interests.87 . Often, 
a principle becomes a tradition when there is societal consensus about 
it, and that consensus is reached when a majority of people endorses the 
principle.88 When courts recognize a fundamental right in response to 
the majority's beliefs,.they are abandoning their role of safeguarding the 
rights of the minority who cannot secure them through the political 
process and are usurping the legislature's job.89 
The Supreme Court has also debated how history and tradition should 
be interpreted when considering the existence of a fundamental right.90 
Justices Scalia's and Brennan's divergent readings of history ahd 
tradition in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 91 illustrate the difficulty of using 
those values to identify and define a fundamental right. The debate in 
Michael H. focused on competing definitions of the interest at stake.92 
83. Ely, supra note 9, at 39-40. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 42. 
86. Id. ("The provisions for which we are trying to locate a source of values were 
phrased in open-ended terms precisely to admit the possibility of growth.") (footnote 
omitted). 
87. Id. at 42-43. 
88. Brown, supra note 72, at 192 (explaining the "common consent" theory). 
89. Ely, supra note 9, at 42-43. 
90. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (plurality opinion); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
·91. Michael H., 491 U.S. 110. 
92. See generally Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential 
Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084-85 
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The level of specificity with which the interest was defined determined 
whether it had been historically and traditionally protected, and thus, 
whether the Court should have recognized it as a fundamental right.93 
In Michael H., a plurality of the Court narrowly defined the interest at 
stake when it determined that Michael H. had no substantive due process 
right to a relationship with his biological daughter, Victoria.94 
Victoria's mother was married to another man, Gerald D., when the 
child was conceived, and Gerald D. was listed as the child's father on 
her birth certificate. 95 After Michael H. was informed that he was 
Victoria's biological father and blood tests confirmed this fact, he sought 
to establish his paternity and visitation rights.96 This appeal to the 
(1981) (noting that the "indeterminacy" of levels of generality is comparable to the 
"arbitrariness inherent in accommodating fundamental rights with competing 
government interests"); Ely, supra note 9, at 40-41 (noting the "common (and 
understandable) trick of varying the relevant tradition's level of abstraction to make it 
come out right") (footnote omitted). 
93. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court agreed that history and tradition 
could be used to establish a fundamental right. The debate centered on what that history 
means. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (plurality opinion). As in Michael H., the specificity with 
which the interest was defined determined whether it traditionally had been protected. 
In Bowers, the Supreme Court held that a state sodomy statute did not violate the 
fundamental rights of homosexuals. Id. at 189. In the plurality opinion, Justice White 
framed the interest narrowly and concluded that history and tradition did not "extend a 
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." Id. at 192. 
Justice White referred to the "ancient roots" of prohibitions against sodomy and cited 
criminal laws against sodomy that dated from colonial times to the present. Id. at 192-
94. Based on this authority, he dismissed any claim that the right was grounded in 
tradition as "at best, facetious." Id. at 194. Justice Burger, writing in concurrence, 
traced back the history of prohibitions against sodomy to Roman and English law to 
reach the same conclusion. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, J., concurring) ("Condemnation of 
those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards."). 
In dissent, however, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the level of specificity with 
which the plurality framed the interest. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice 
Blackmun stated that the case was not about "'a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy."' Id. (quoting plurality opinion at 191). Instead, the case was 
about '"the right to be let alone."' Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
478 (1928)) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). By framing the case as a right to privacy issue, 
Justice Blackmun was able to draw on Supreme Court precedents that protect the rights 
of individuals to make choices about how they conduct their personal lives. Id. at 204-
06. In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens also took issue with the plurality's narrow 
framing of the interest. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that 
the plurality only examined homosexual sodomy and ignored heterosexual sodomy even 
though historically both kinds of sodomy were prohibited. Id. at 215. Justice Stevens' 
reading of history and tradition, therefore, does not support Justice White's exclusion of 
only homosexual sodomy from heightened constitutional protection. Again, differing 
judicial interpretations of history and tradition point out the inconsistencies and 
subjectivity of those values as sources for recognizing fundamental rights. 
94. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124. 
95. Id. at 113-14, 124. 
96. Id. at 114. 
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Supreme Court arose out of the lower courts' denial of his paternity and 
visitation claims.97 
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, rejected Michael H. 's argument 
that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship 
with his biological daughter.98 In reaching that conclusion, Justice 
Scalia asserted the need to root a fundamental right in history and 
tradition.99 Given that need, Justice Scalia considered "whether the 
relationship between . . . Michael and Victoria has been treated as a 
protected family unit under the historic practices of our society."100 
Justice Scalia determined that history and tradition did not protect the 
relationship between an unmarried father and his illegitimate daugh-
ter, 101 but history and tradition have protected the rights of legitimate 
parents and the "marital family."102 Justice Scalia stated that Michael 
H. had failed to find any historical precedent to support constitutional 
protection of his relationship with his daughter: 
What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental rights to 
the natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital 
union that wishes to embrace the child. We are not aware of a single case, old 
or new, that has done so. This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights . . . 
are made. 103 . 
Thus, he concluded that the Court would not favor the interests of 
Michael H., the "adulterous natural father," over the historically-
recognized rights of Gerald D., the "marital father.'' 104 
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, challenged the level of specificity 
with which the plurality defined the interest at stake. 105 Justice 
97. Id. at 115-16. 
98. Id. at 124. 
99. Id. at 122 ("In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [Due 
Process] Clause, we have insisted . . . that it be an interest traditionally protected by our 
society."). 
100. Id. at 124. 
101. Id. at 124-25. 
102. Id. at 123-24 (noting the "historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too 
strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary 
family") (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
103. Id. at 127. 
104. Id. at 130. 
105. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested a broader 
interpretation of the interest: 
Today's plurality, however, does not ask whether parenthood is an interest 
that historically has received our attention and protection; the answer to that 
19 
Brennan noted that the Court had not defined the interests so specifically 
in other family rights cases, such as a couple's decision to use contracep-
tives and an individual's right to raise his illegitimate children. 106 If 
the Court had characterized the interests as narrowly in other cases, he 
concluded, it would have determined that those interests had not been 
protected by history and tradition, and thus, were not fundamental 
rights.107 
Justice Brennan proposed that the Court instead define Michael H. 's 
interest more generally as "that of a parent and child in their relationship 
with each other."108 Using that definition, he concluded that Michael 
H. 's relationship with Victoria was "sufficiently substantial to qualify as 
a liberty interest under our prior cases."109 The problem with this 
definition, however, is that it begs the question. Justice Brennan cannot 
really determine whether parenthood has been protected historically 
without defining what he means by parenthood. Justice Brennan may 
have been offering a definition of parenthood when he compared 
Michael H. 's interests to those of unwed, biological fathers in earlier 
Supreme Court cases. 110 He read those cases as establishing a tradition 
of protecting the rights of unwed fathers and concluded that Michael 
H. 's situation fell within that tradition. 111
Justice Brennan discussed at length the way that the plurality read past 
cases and used history and tradition to narrowly circumscribe the 
parameters of a fundamental right. 112 He criticized the plurality's use 
of tradition because it ignored the "malleable" and "elusive" nature of 
tradition and cautioned against using tradition to place an "objective 
boundary" around the Constitution.113 Justice Brennan further noted 
question is too clear for dispute. Instead, the plurality asks whether the 
specific variety of parenthood under consideration--a natural father's 
relationship with a child whose mother is married to another man--has 
enjoyed such protection. 
Id.; see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition 
of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1085-98 (1990) (criticizing Justice Scalia's claim 
that he is proposing a value-neutral approach to selecting the level of generality for 
defining the fundamental right at stake in Michael H. ). 
106. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. at 139-40. 
108. Id. at 141-42. In tum, the plurality criticized this broad characterization of 
the interests for giving judges "imprecise guidance" and leading to "arbitrary 
decisionmaking." Id. at 128 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
109. Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 142-43. 
112. Id. at 137-38. 
113. Id. at 137. Justice Brennan observed that, contrary to the plurality's 
assertions, tradition does not place an "objective boundary" around the Constitution. 
Id. The sources of our nation's traditions are varied and open to interpretation, and thus, 
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that even if the Court did consult history and tradition, 114 it would find 
that in past cases history and tradition have been used to protect the 
rights of parents and, in particular, the rights of unwed, biological 
fathers.11 5 
Both Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia turned to history and tradition 
in determining whether Michael H. 's interests should be constitutionally 
protected, and they agreed that tradition protects the rights of fathers. 
Their debate centered on whether history and tradition protect "marital 
father[s]," as Justice Scalia maintained, 116 or unwed, biological fathers, 
as Justice Brennan asserted. 117 Thus, their differences were not in 
deciding whether to rely on history and tradition, but in :figuring out 
what that history and tradition meant. 118 
Courts face a similar problem of unclear history and elusive tradition 
when they seek to determine whether parents have a fundamental right 
to corporally punish their children. The courts agree that history and 
tradition protect parents' rights to guide their children's upbringing. 119 
The issues then become whether history and tradition include corporal 
punishment within that right, and if so, how far the right of reasonable 
corporal punishment extends. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental rights of parents 
to direct the upbringing of their children as part of an enduring 
people can "disagree about the content [and significance] of particular traditions." Id. 
Justice Brennan underscored the shifting nature of tradition by pointing out how difficult 
it is to fix the starting and ending points of a tradition. Id. at 138. Therefore, the 
ephemeral, subjective nature of tradition makes it an unreliable source for defining a 
fundamental right. 
114. Id. at 139 ("It is not that tradition has been irrelevant to our prior decisions.") . 
115. Id. at 138-39, 141-43. Justice Brennan further stated that: "It is ironic that an 
approach so utterly dependent on tradition is so indifferent to our precedents." Id. at 
138. 
116. Id. at 130 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
117. Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
118. This is the "malleable" and "elusive" nature of tradition problem that Justice 
Brennan flagged. Id. at 137. 
119. See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925); see also Clasen v. Pruhs, 95 N.W. 640, 645 (Neb. 1903) (Sedgwick, 
J., concurring) ('"Parental discipline, rightly understood, is to assist the strivings and 
aspirations of the child's better nature. And the child, needing this assistance, is 
therefore entitled to it."') (quoting JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL 
LAW§ 880 (1857)); Landerv. Seaver, 76 Am. Dec. 156, 161-62 (Vt. 1859) ("This great, 
and to some extent irresponsible, power of control and correction is invested in the 
parent by nature and necessity."). 
21 
American tradition, 120 but it has never stated whether that tradition 
includes the parental right to administer corporal punishment. 121 
Proponents of including corporal punishment in the fundamental right 
will point to its long-standing use and widespread acceptance in 
American society and argue that this amounts to a tradition.122 They 
will note that this tradition of allowing parents to use corporal punish-
ment to discipline their children has taken root over the past two 
centuries and can be traced back to English common law.123 Early 
American cases adopted English common-law principles and affirmed 
the "power of control and correction . . . invested in the parent by 
nature and necessity."124 The tradition has deepened over time, and 
today every state continues to recognize the parental ability to administer 
reasonable corporal punishment. 125 These legislative enactments, 
120. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
121. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,663 (1977) (noting the "historical and 
contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment" in public schools). 
122. See id. at 660 (discussing the history of corporal punishment in the schools). 
The Court noted that "[t]he use of corporal punishment in this country as a means of 
disciplining schoolchildren dates back to the colonial period." Id. The Court also noted 
the "background of historical and contemporary approval ofreasonable corporal punish-
ment." Id. at 663. See also Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.) (noting 
"a settled tradition" of allowing reasonable corporal punishment in schools), ajf'd 
without opinion, 423 U.S. 907 (1975); Jon M. Bylsma, Note, Hands Off! New North 
Carolina General Statutes Section JJSC-390 Allows Local School Boards To Ban 
Corporal Punishment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 2058, 2062 (1992) (detailing how the in loco 
parentis justification for corporal punishment in schools has eroded and given way to 
justifications based solely on institutional control needs). 
123. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 120 (1768) (noting that battery is legal when parents are giving moderate 
correction to their children); 2 JAMES JSENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 169 
(1971) (noting that parents have "a right to the exercise of such discipline, as may be 
requisite for the discharge of their sacred trust") (footnote omitted); see also James 
Papakirk, Comment, Michigan's New Corporal Punishment Amendment: Where the 
Good Act Giveth, Did the Amendment Taketh Away?, 10 COOLEY L. REV. 383, 387 
(1993) (discussing the religious and secular roots of corporal punishment and noting that 
fundamentalist religious tradition accounts for much of the rationale for corporal punish-
ment). 
124. Lander v. Seaver, 76 Am. Dec. 156, 161-62 (Vt. 1859); see also Gould v. 
Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (holding that when a father places his son 
on a navigational ship for the purpose of learning the trade, the ship master may inflict 
corporal punishment on that minor); Vanvactor v. State, 15 N.E. 341 (Ind. 1888) 
(holding that a teacher may rightfully apply corporal punishment and that the whipping 
of a child did not constitute assault and battery per se); Rowe v. Rugg, 91 N.W. 903 
(Iowa 1902) (holding that a mother has the same right as a father to discipline a child); 
Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923) (explaining that an unemancipated child 
cannot bring a tort action against parents). 
125. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (1989); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-605 {Michie 1987); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-703 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18 
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. 
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judicial decisions, and secondary authority126 can be interpreted to 
mean that history has endorsed a parental right of corporal punish-
ment.127 Therefore, one can conclude that the parental right to use 
corporal punishment is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental."128 
Opponents of including corporal punishment as a fundamental right 
will challenge this reading of history. They might acknowledge that a 
practice of allowing parents to corporally punish their children has 
§ 16-3-20(3) (Harrison 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-309 (1985 & Supp. 1993); IND. 
CODE ANN.§ 31-6-4-3(e) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 503.110 
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(4) (West 1986 & Supp. 
1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106 (West 1964); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 
§ 4-501(2) (1991 & Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b(6) (West 1993); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.061 
(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 45-3-107 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-1413 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 15-200.508 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 627:6 (1986 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 35.10 (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 110-101.1 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05 (1985); Omo REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 844 (West 1993); 
OR. REV. STAT.§ 161.205 (1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 509 (1993); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 20-7-490 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-18-5 (1993); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.61 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401 (1953); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.015 (West 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.45 (West 
1993); see, e.g., People v. Whitehurst, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1992); Howard v. Florida Dep 't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 589 So. 
2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Peters, 780 P.2d 602 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); 
People v. Ball, 317 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 1974); State v. Bell, 223 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1974); 
State v. Carmichael, 727 P.2d 918 (Kan. 1986); Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836 
(Mass. 1979); Natural Mother v. Hinds County Welfare Dep't, 579 So. 2d 1269 (Miss. 
1991); Mancinelli v. Crosby, 589 A.2d 664 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); State v. 
Osbourne, 808 P.2d 624 (N.M. 1991); State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1981); 
Marlar v. Bill, 178 S.W.2d 634 (Tenn. 1944); Gerety v. Gerety, 306 A.2d 693 (Vt. 
1973); Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419 (Va. 1947); Smith v. West Virginia 
State Bd. of Educ., 295 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1982); Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263 (Wyo. 
1985). 
126. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 147(1) (1965). 
127. In Baker v. Owen, the court noted that the parental interests protected in 
Meyer, Pierce, and Prince were rooted in history and contrasted those interests with the 
paren_t's objections to the use of corporal punishment in the instant case. Baker v. 
Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd without opinion, 423 U.S. 907 (1975). 
The court stated that history did not support the parent's opposition to corporal 
punishment and further observed that such opposition "bucks a settled tradition of 
countenancing such punishment when reasonable." Id. (citations omitted). The court 
also stated, however, that the issue of corporal punishment was "unsettled and probably 
incapable of categorical resolution." Id. (citations omitted). 
128. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (citations omitted). 
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developed over time, but they will assert that the tradition is under attack 
today. Those attacks have taken the form of heightened restrictions on 
parents who use corporal punishment129 and the banning of corporal 
punishment in other contexts, such as in public schools, 130 in pris-
ons, 131 and in the foster care system.132 Furthermore, children have 
no ability to shape the history and tradition from which such a right 
would emerge. These changes in corporal punishment laws and the 
exclusion of children's voices from the process of establishing a right 
suggest that a societal consensus no longer exists on the use of corporal 
punishment. If traditions are based on the long-standing practices agreed 
to by a majority of the community and that agreement erodes, then the 
foundation for the tradition also crumbles. 
It may be dangerous, therefore, to create a right based on a tradition 
when that tradition can disappear. If the tradition no longer exists, then 
the danger is that the right will also become extinct. Society used to be 
more tolerant of corporal punishment than it is today.133 The erosion 
of support for corporal punishment reflects the "malleable" and "elusive" 
nature of using tradition in establishing fundamental rights.134 A right 
should not be vulnerable to social whims, and its viability should not 
depend on whether a tradition has become outdated. The Court 
recognizes an interest as a fundamental right in order to protect the right 
when it comes under attack. The Court has never relied on historical 
consensus to contract the scope of a fundamental right; it has only turned 
to history and tradition to expand a right. Given the decreasing 
acceptance of corporal punishment, the Court should not use history and 
tradition to establish a right that may soon have to be contracted. In 
129. Spare the Rod? Mother Arrested for Slapping Child, supra note 2, at 7 
(discussing a mother's arrest for slapping her nine-year-old son across the face in a 
grocery store). 
130. NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS, 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT FACT SHEET 1 (1993) [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (noting that in 
the past 20 years, the number of states abolishing corporal punishment in schools has 
increased from 1 to 26); see also Nadine Block & Robert Fatham, Convincing State 
Legislatures to Ban Corporal Punishment, 9 CmLDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 21, 23 (1988) 
(noting that 30 of the 38 largest metropolitan areas do not allow the use of corporal 
punishment in their schools); Bylsma, supra note 122, at 2059 (arguing that a trend 
toward statutory bans on the use of corporal punishment has emerged and thus has 
broken the tradition of allowing corporal punishment in public schools). 
131. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/3-8-7(b)(l) (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
132. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 1531.5(d) (West 1993). 
133. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977) ("The use of corporal 
punishment in this country as a means of disciplining school children dates back to the 
colonial period."). But see FACT SHEET, supra note 130, at 1 (noting that the 
contemporary trend is to eliminate the use of corporal punishment in schools). 
134. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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effect, when the right does not need protection, tradition ensures it. 
Once the right is under majoritarian attack and needs protection, history 
and tradition cannot provide it. Thus, the Court would be on firmer 
ground if it relied on some value other than history and tradition to 
establish a fundamental right of corporal punishment. 
C. "Evolving Standards of Decency" 
Another possible source considered in establishing fundamental rights 
is the "contemporary values"135 or "evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society."136 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged the role of societal values in interpreting the Due Process 
Clause: "[D]ue process is not measured by the yardstick of personal 
reaction . . . but by that whole community sense of 'decency and 
fairness' that has been woven by common experience into the fabric of 
acceptable conduct. It is on this bedrock that this Court has established 
the concept of due process."137 The premise underlying the evolving 
standards of decency theory is that judges should use the values that 
modem society wants to protect as the basis for identifying fundamental 
rights.138 Once those values have developed to the point where they 
135. Lupu, supra note 72, at 1047; see also Terrance R. Sandalow, Judicial 
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1186 (1977) ("[C]onstitutional law 
is to be understood as expressing contemporary societal nonns."). 
136. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
137. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,436 (1957). The Supreme Court has used 
this standard when deciding if the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause had been violated. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court struck 
down a prisoner's claim that arose when a physician failed to order additional tests to 
detennine what was causing the prisoner's back problems. Id. at 107. The Court found 
that this failure to diagnose and treat did not amount to "deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs," which was required to violate the evolving standards of decency 
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 106. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited 
a line of Eighth Amendment cases in which it held unconstitutional "punishments which 
are incompatible with 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society."' Id. at 102 (citations omitted) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
101 (1958)). Thus, the Court indicated its willingness to look to contemporary values 
to assess the constitutionality of a practice under the Eighth Amendment, but it did not 
further explain how it would identify and define those evolving standards. More 
recently, the Court observed that "contemporary standards of decency always are 
violated" when prison officials use excessive force on prisoners. Hudson v. McMillan, 
503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). 
138. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial 
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 320 (1993) (explaining 
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have become part of the social fabric, the Court should protect them as 
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause.139 In this way, the 
Supreme Court will be interpreting the Constitution to reflect societal 
changes and contemporary norms. 
The use of evolving standards of decency as the basis for recognizing 
fundamental rights raises a host of issues. The majority of those issues 
focuses on defining the standard. First, the standard assumes the 
existence of uniform beliefs about what values should be protected. 140 
This standard, however, fails to acknowledge that our pluralistic society 
may mean that people who have different religious, ethnic, and socio-
economic backgrounds do not share the same beliefs. 141 Without these 
shared beliefs, people may not agree on what the evolving standards of 
decency are. These cultural differences among people and groups may 
be compounded by geographic differences when community norms vary 
among regions, states, and localities.142 The shifting meaning of 
community norms may make it impossible to reach any consensus about 
which contemporary values deserve constitutional protection. 
A second, related issue focuses on determining the point in time that 
a societal belief forms the basis of a constitutional right. The dangers 
of fixing a point in time arise at both ends of the spectrum.143 At one 
that the Supreme Court might base substantive due process protection on "[its] sense of 
which of the eligible explanatory rationales best accords with moral intuitions or 
principles that it takes to be widely shared in the society at large"). But see Ely, supra 
note 9, at 52 (concluding that judicial reference to societal norms in establishing a 
fundamental right merely disguises the judge's reliance on his or her own values). 
139. See Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double 
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973) ("The Court's 
task is to ascertain the weight of the principle in conventional morality and to convert 
the moral principle into a legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional 
law."). 
140. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 436. 
141. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1722-
23 (1988) (discussing the danger of ignoring the differences among American 
subcultures). 
142. See Ely, supra note 9, at 46; Lupu, supra note 72, at 1047 (observing that 
"social consensus is difficult to measure, especially on a nationwide basis"); Michael J. 
Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of 
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 732 n.201 (1976) (noting that "the 
problem of national versus local standards is an important and complex one with subtle 
implications" and advocating the use of a national standard when determining 
contemporary values). 
143. See Ely, supra note 9, at 39 (discussing the difficulty of identifying the 
relevant time frame when tradition provides a source of a fundamental right); Lupu, 
supra note 72, at 1045 (responding to Professor Ely's concerns about pinpointing the 
relevant historical time frame and noting that "[t]he length of historical support required 
to support the claim might vary with the intensity with which it is held, but, in any 
event, no less than a generation of special respect ought to suffice"). 
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end, the concern is that the evolving standards of decency will enable 
the Court to base a fundamental right on a passing trend. When the 
trend has faded, the right will remain, but it will have no foundation. At 
the other end, the risk in waiting too long to recognize a right is that the 
evolving standards of decency will become indistinguishable from using 
tradition as a source of fundamental rights. 
The Supreme Court has indicated, in at least one opinion, that the 
evolving standards of decency should form a "bedrock" for establishing 
a fundamental right. 144 That language suggests that a right will only 
be recognized after the societal norm has been firmly established. If this 
is the requirement, there will be no difference between basing a 
fundamental right on the evolving standards of decency and grounding 
it in tradition. Currently, the only difference between the two sources 
of a right is that tradition requires the consensus to have lasted longer 
than is required under the evolving standards of decency.145 A 
tradition is a practice or belief that has withstood the test of time, while 
the evolving standards of decency include more recent, contemporary 
values. The challenge involved with using the evolving standards of 
decency is figuring out whether and how the law should change to 
reflect changing societal standards. People's perspectives, and thus 
societal standards, may change, but the law might not be able to 
implement these new perspectives and standards--perhaps because of a 
breakdown in the democratic process. When the Court blurs the sole 
distinction between the two sources, it undermines any advantage that 
the evolving standards of decency may offer and opens that standard up 
to the same criticisms pressed against tradition and consensus.146 The 
challenge then is to determine when a value is established long enough 
to be recognized as an evolving standard of decency but not so long that 
it is in effect a tradition. 
The last major issue is determining the Court's role in defining the 
evolving standards of decency. Some commentators, such as Professor 
Ely, maintain that legislatures are better equipped than the Court to 
144. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957). One commentator questions 
whether a consensus even existed in that case given the fact that it was a split decision, 
with three Justices dissenting. See Ely, supra note 9, at 45-46. 
145. My colleague, Randy Lee, offered helpful insights into this distinction. 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 81-89. 
27 
determine what contemporary values are. 147 In Professor Ely's 
opinion, the legislature is the more democratic body because the public 
elects its members, and thus, is in a better position than the judiciary to 
ascertain society's "genuine values."148 Professor Ely concludes his 
criticisms of the Court's use of the evolving standards of decency by 
noting that this approach represents nothing "more than a conscious or 
unconscious cover for the judge's own values."149 Other commentators 
take issue with this position and note that courts are "admirably situated 
to observe and to sense the evolution of contemporary moral cul-
ture."150 One commentator has observed that the legislature's expertise 
in shaping economic and social policy does not extend to defining "the 
public morals."151 He notes that the legislature is equipped to respond 
only to established social conventions but that the Court "is ordained by 
tradition to serve as a forum for the subtle dialectical interplay of 
complex, principled ethical discourse."152 Thus, the Court's role in 
determining what constitutes the evolving standards of decency is 
unsettled. 
These three concerns should be addressed when the issues involve the 
existence and scope of a fundamental, parental right to administer 
corporal punishment. The questions are whether the evolving standards 
of decency can establish this fundamental right and, if so, whether they 
define the parameters of the right. 
147. See Ely, supra note 9, at 49-52 ("[A]s between courts and legislatures, it is 
clear the latter are better situated to reflect consensus."). Professor Ely argues that the 
legislature is better able to identify societal values than members of the judiciary, whom 
he labels the "nondemocratic elite." Id. at 51; see also Lupu, supra note 72, at 1047 
(agreeing with "Professor Ely's observation that the opinions of lawyers, judges, and 
'experts' alone are insufficient" to determine social consensus). But see Perry, supra 
note 142, at 729 (observing that "the Supreme Court ... [is] quite competent to measure 
the metes and bounds of the public morals" and concluding that the Court "need not be 
paralyzed by self-doubt about its institutional ability to determine accurately the contours 
of the public morals"); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 189-90 (1993) (criticizing Ely's 
theory because it fails to recognize that the courts, by identifying the "defects" in the 
constitutional system, must make "substantive moral and political choices") (citing 
Bruce Ackerman's theory endorsing judicial involvement with substantive moral and 
political choices stated in Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 713 (1985)). 
148. Ely, supra note 9, at 51. 
149. Id. at 52; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 63-69 (1980). Professor Ely noted that even if consensus can be 
reached, "consensus is not reliably discoverable, at least not by courts." Id. at 64. 
150. Perry, supra note 142, at 729; see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, I WE THE 
PEOPLE 6-7 (1991) (arguing that judicial opinions are legitimate implementations of the 
moral-political choices that the people have made). 
151. Perry, supra note 142, at 729. 
152. Id. 
28 
[VOL. 32: l, 1995] Parental Corporal Punishment 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
The main obstacle to using the evolving standards of decency to 
establish a fundamental right of corporal punishment is reaching a 
consensus about societal attitudes toward corporal punishment. 153 
People's attitudes about corporal punishment may vary based on age, 
race, religion, socio-economic status, or geographic location.154 
Certainly, they may vary depending on one's status as a parent or a 
child, and the perspectives of children-who are the people most 
affected by this issue-have not been taken into account in the current 
debate. Therefore, there may be no "common experience" on which to 
build a "community sense" that parental use of corporal punishment 
deserves heightened constitutional protection.155 Without that consen-
sus, a right does not exist.156 
Moreover, it is impossible to fix a point in time where the evolving 
standards of decency either clearly endorse or reject parental corporal 
punishment as a fundamental right. On one hand, there are signs that 
the standard is evolving away from recognition of the right, but the issue 
is unresolved. For example, some states have banned the use of corporal 
punishment on children in foster care157 and in public schools. 158 On 
the other hand, there are indications that parental corporal punishment 
is recognized as a fundamental right. Every state has conferred on 
parents, through judicial decisions or legislative enactments, the right to 
use reasonable corporal punishment.159 These mixed signals indicate 
that neither the existence nor the absence of a right of parental corporal 
punishment can be fixed at a certain point in time. Because no 
153. The Supreme Court discussed conflicting attitudes about corporal punishment 
in the schools and noted that "[p]rofessional and public opinion is sharply divided on the 
practice." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977); see also Papakirk, supra note 
123, at 388 (discussing the disagreements among social scientists about the effectiveness 
of corporal punishment). 
154. See, e.g., Maria Newman, Raising Children Right Isn't Always Enough, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, § 4, at 12 ("Immigrant families, in particular, feel caught in a trap 
laid by shifting American standards for punishment. Disciplining older children in ways 
that were once acceptable and are still used back home-welt-raising spankings with 
belts or paddles, for example----may mean a teacher or welfare worker opening a child 
abuse investigation."). 
155. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30, 132-33. 
157. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.§ 234.40 (West 1993); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 1531.5(d) (West 1993). 
158. The number of states banning corporal punishment in public schools has 
grown from one in the early 1970s to 26 today. See FACT SHEET, supra note 130, at 1. 
159. See supra note 125. 
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consensus exists, courts should leave the democratic process alone to 
protect the parental interest. 
Finally, this lack of legislative consensus leaves courts with the task 
of ascertaining contemporary beliefs about the status of corporal 
punishment. As noted earlier, the problem with leaving this task to the 
courts is that judges might be tempted to impose their own beliefs about 
corporal punishment on society. 160 Thus, the evolving standards would 
not reflect the public's view about corporal punishment; they would 
represent the viewpoint of the "nondemocratic elite."161 
In sum, the evolving standards of decency are too unsettled to 
establish the existence of a fundamental right to corporal punishment. 
Although the parental right to direct the upbringing of one's children is 
well-settled, there is no contemporary, societal consensus about whether 
that right includes parental use of corporal punishment or what 
constitutes reasonable corporal punishment. Similarly, tradition provides 
no consensus about the existence of a fundamental right to use corporal 
punishment and about how to balance parents' and children's interests 
in determining the parameters of reasonable corporal punishment. The 
"elusive" and "malleable" nature of basing a right on tradition and the 
wide range of contemporary values are shaky foundations on which to 
build a fundamental right. 162 Thus, one must look elsewhere for a 
parental right of corporal punishment. 
D. The Political Process 
Another place to look would be to the political process. Using the 
political process, society would tum to legislatures to recognize and 
define parents' rights to corporally punish their children. At least one 
commentator has recommended. that legislatures, not the courts, are in 
the best position to reflect societal consensus about what constitutes a 
fundamental right.163 When the parental right to corporally punish 
one's children is at issue, society should rely on the legislative process, 
and not look to the judiciary to establish such a right. 
The :first argument in favor of using the legislature to determine the 
status of a parent's right to use corporal punishment is that the political 
process has already addressed and resolved this issue. Every state 
recognizes parents' ability to administer reasonable corporal punishment, 
and states have given parents broad discretion to determine what is 
160. See Ely, supra note 9, at 44-45; ELY, supra note 149, at 67-69. 
161. See Ely, supra note 9, at 51. 
162. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
163. See Ely, supra note 9, at 49-51. 
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reasonable. 164 The legislatures may not have clarified the parameters 
of reasonable corporal punishment, but they have sufficiently secured the 
parental interest so that the Court need not further protect it by 
establishing a fundamental, parental right of corporal punishment. 
In response to this argument, one should not assume that a right which 
has not been threatened in the past will not be threatened in the future. 
When the issue is before the Court, the iinterest is clearly being 
threatened. Therefore, the judiciary is needed to safeguard the right by 
giving it fundamental status. 165 However, the second argument in 
favor of leaving the issue to the political process may allay these 
concerns about the parental interest in corporal punishment being 
threatened. 
The second argument is that the right to vote gives parents a way to 
protect themselves from these threats against their ability to use corporal 
punishment. Unlike children who are too young to have a voice in the 
political process, parents usually are adults who are old enough to vote. 
Parents who believe that the laws unfairly restrict their right to discipline 
their children can vote to change them. Other laws might not generate 
as much interest or debate as corporal punishment laws because they are 
far removed from the public's every day concerns. In contrast, the 
extent of the parental right to discipline children is a matter that directly 
affects how many people conduct their daily lives. Because corporal 
punishment is an issue that people feel strongly about, 166 parents who 
believe that the laws are unduly burdensome can try to mobilize public 
opinion against them. 167 If those parents are unable to generate 
support for their position, then the laws should stand. If, however, 
people agree that the corporal punishment laws infringe too greatly on 
164. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
165. See ACKERMAN, supra note 150, at 6-7. 
166. The area of parent-child relations has received a great deal of public attention. 
For example, the discussion about "family values" during the 1992 presidential election 
symbolizes its emergence on the national agenda. 
167. The usual difficulty with relying on this approach to establish a right is that 
it makes the existence of a right dependent on an expression of societal consensus. 
Under this approach, if a person or group cannot find a majority of people to agree with 
them, then they do not have a right. This typically presents a problem for people 
seeking to exercise rights such as abortion or certain kinds of speech. They are unable 
to form a societal consensus because of the nature of the right. The right of parental 
corporal punishment is different, however, because those who would exercise it are 
likely able to form a political consensus about its existence. This consensus is reflected 
in the legislative process which has traditionally been receptive to the right. 
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parents' rights, then those laws should be struck down or changed to 
comport with societal expectations. 168 Parents can thus ensure that the 
legislature will safeguard their right, as long as it reflects societal 
consensus, and need not tum to the courts to preserve this right. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court should not identify a fundamental, 
parental right of corporal punishment for several reasons. First, no basis 
for recognizing such a right can be found in Supreme Court precedent, 
by looking to history and tradition, or by considering the evolving 
standards of decency. Although these sources do not explicitly reject 
fundamental rights status for parental use of corporal punishment, they 
are at best ambivalent about the nature of this parental interest, and thus, 
provide no consensus on which to ground a fundamental right. Second, 
a decision not to recognize a fundamental right of parents to administer, 
corporal punishment seeks to safeguard children's right to autonomy. 
Children have a liberty interest in their own bodily integrity; there is a 
better chance of preserving this interest if the fundamental right of 
parents to direct their children's upbringing does not include the right to 
exert physical force. Third, the legislature is better able than the Court 
to ascertain the public's views on the use of corporal punishment and 
can draft laws that reflect the level of protection that society wants to 
give to parents who administer it. Because this majoritarian process 
adequately protects parents' ability to administer corporal punishment, 
there is no need for the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental right. 
Although the legislature is equipped to give parents the authority to 
administer reasonable corporal punishment based on a general consen-
sus, 169 there are certain things that should be protected from 
majoritarian regulation. This is so because the legislature responds to 
the majority, but the courts safeguard the interests of the minority. 
Therefore, the courts should determine the scope of the reasonableness 
standard. Once the legislature has established a general consensus in 
favor of reasonable parental corporal punishment, courts can impose 
limits on the parental use of force as a way of securing the interests of 
the minority-children. 
168. But see Ely, supra note 9, at 43-45 (discussing the disadvantages of basing 
a right on a majoritarian consensus). 
169. As noted earlier, the problem of children not having a voice in the political 
process in which rights are established is a flaw in using history and the evolving 
standards of decency to determine the existence of a fundamental right of parental 
corporal punishment. Children are among the groups whose interests are prone to be 
ignored in analyzing the presence of a consensus. Therefore, they are precisely the kind 
of isolated people that rights are designed to protect. See supra text accompanying notes 
153-68. 
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III. THE SCOPE OF REASONABLE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
A. The Current Test 
Even if the political process chooses to permit parents to administer 
reasonable corporal punishment, courts still struggle to define the 
parameters of that reasonableness standard. The line between reasonable 
and excessive force has proved difficult to draw, and courts have been 
content to sketch the contours, but not the details, of how that line 
should be drawn. 170 Although the current test for reasonableness may 
vary slightly among states, courts consistently rely on certain criteria to 
determine the reasonableness of the force. 171 The courts may not 
actually articulate these criteria, but they consider three factors: parental 
intent in administering the corporal punishment, the nature of the 
corporal punishment, and the circumstances surrounding the punish-
170. Both tradition and the evolving standards of decency support the distinction 
between reasonable and excessive corporal punishment. Although ambiguity surrounds 
what constitutes reasonable corporal punishment, no such ambiguity surrounds what 
constitutes excessive punishment. The relevant cases respect parental autonomy in
making child-rearing decisions, but they do not give parents unlimited authority. See, 
e.g., State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785, 788 (R.I. 1985) ("[T]he clear weight of authority 
holds that a parent is subject to criminal liability when he/she inflicts excessive corporal 
punishment."). If the parents use excessive force, then the state will intervene to protect 
the welfare of the child. See Johnson v. State, 36 Am. Dec. 322 (Tenn. 1837) ("It is not 
. . . the infliction of punishment, but the excess which constitutes the offense . . . . 
[W]hat this excess shall be, is not a conclusion of law, but a question of fact for the 
determination of the jury."). Thus, the historical tradition has been to respect the right 
of parents to use force on their children but to limit the scope of the right to the use of 
reasonable force. Similarly, the evolving standards of decency, as reflected in recent 
legislative enactments and judicial decisions, indicate that a distinction exists between 
reasonable and excessive corporal punishment, but they do not suggest where that line 
should be drawn. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18 (West 1986 & Supp. 
1993) (suggesting the use of physical force upon another person is justifiable when it is 
inflicted reasonably). 
171. Courts have evaluated the reasonableness of the force under these criteria in 
both civil and criminal actions. See In re Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 1977) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147(1) standard for 
reasonableness when determining that a parent's corporal punishment of his child was 
unreasonable); State v. 'Singleton, 705 P.2d 825, 826-27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) 
(evaluating the reasonableness of the parent's corporal punishment under a totality of the 




First, parents can use physical force against their children if they 
intend to control, train, or educate the children through the use of such 
force. 173 The parental use of force must be designed to preserve 
discipline or teach children and not to express anger or frustration 
toward them.174 If the force is not motivated by legitimate reasons, 
then courts will not look to the remaining factors and balance them. 175 
Second, the nature of the force used is relevant to deciding its reason-
ableness. The number of times the child is struck, the instrument used, 
and the location and severity of the child's injuries all help to determine 
whether the corporal punishment is excessive or reasonable. 176 Courts 
have considered these factors in the context of individual cases when 
evaluating the reasonableness of the force and have not attempted to 
draw bright lines about the level of force required to make the parental 
conduct unreasonable. 177 Finally, the circumstances surrounding the 
corporal punishment include such factors as the child's age and 
developmental level, the reason that the child is being punished, and the 
availability of other less severe means of discipline. 178 These factors 
give courts a framework for evaluating the reasonableness of the parental 
use of corporal punishment. 
172. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 147(1) (1965). 
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 147(1) (1965) ("A parent is privileged 
to apply such reasonable force ... upon his child as he reasonably believes to be 
necessary for its proper control, training, or education.''); see also MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 3.08 (1985) ("The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if: 
... (a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the 
minor, including the prevention or punishment of his misconduct[.]"). 
174. In re Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d at 514-15 (distinguishing force applied for the 
"'proper training or education of the child or for the preservation of discipline"' from 
force '"administered for the gratification of passion or rage."') ( citations omitted); see 
also State v. Hunt, 406 P.2d 208, 222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (commenting that corporal 
punishment becomes unreasonable when a "parent ceases to act in good faith and with 
parental affection, and acts immoderately, cruelly or mercilessly, with a malicious desire 
to inflict pain") (citations omitted); Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 104, 335 
P.2d 736, 737 (1959) (noting that a parent "may administer reasonable punishment with 
impunity, but when he exceeds that limit and does so willfully he commits a battery and 
is civilly liable for the consequences"). 
175. In re Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (stating that the use of force is only 
permitted in those circumstances). 
176. See, e.g., id. (discussing the "means of punishment," which included the 
severity of injury and the number of marks on the child among other factors, as relevant 
to determining the reasonableness of the parents' conduct). 
177. For a discussion of how the courts have tried to draw the line between 
reasonable and excessive force, see State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1985). 
178. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977); Harbaugh v. Common-
wealth, 167 S.E.2d 329, 332 (Va. 1969); State v. Singleton, 705 P.2d 825, 827 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965). 
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A consensus may exist about the parameters of what constitutes 
reasonable corporal punishment at the extreme ends of the spec-
trum-when it is clearly reasonable or clearly excessive.179 For 
example, most people would agree that if a child is throwing a temper 
tantrum in a public place, a parent is using reasonable force when she 
picks the child up and carries him away. Similarly, there is general 
agreement that a prolonged beating of a child resulting in permanent 
injuries to the child constitutes excessive force. The problem then is not 
in reaching an agreement about the broad parameters of the right at the 
extreme ends of the spectrum but in finding a consensus about the 
details of the right in the gray, middle area. In searching for consensus 
in that middle area, courts must balance two sets of historically protected 
rights: parents' rights to corporal punishment and children's substantive 
due process interests. 180 
Children have a long-standing liberty interest in bodily integrity which 
must be weighed against the parental right to discipline through corporal 
punishment. 181 This interest has its roots in century-old precedent in 
which the Supreme Court upheld the "right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others."182 When the Court discussed this interest in 
the context of corporal punishment of children in schools, it noted that 
179. A line between clearly reasonable and clearly excessive force has been drawn 
by legislatures and courts. See supra note 125. 
180. The issue of the existence of constitutional rights for children was unsettled 
at one point in American history. Although the extent of some of those rights may still 
be debated, it is well-settled that children are separate legal entities from their parents. 
See Developments, supra note 72, at 1358. For a historical perspective on the rights of 
children as separate entities and the manner the Supreme Court has expanded or curtailed 
these rights, see SAMUEL M. DAVIS & MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
AND THE LAW (1987). 
181. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 (noting children's substantive due process 
interest in "be[ing] free from ... unjustified intrusions on personal security"); see also 
Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd without opinion, 423 U.S. 907 
(1975). In Baker, the court upheld a student's right to minimal procedural due process 
before corporal punishment is inflicted on him in school. The court further noted that 
the child "does have an interest, protected by the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in avoiding corporal punishment. . . . We believe that the concept must 
include, in appropriate instances, personal security in the seemingly small things of life 
as well as in the obviously momentous." Id. 
182. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also Cynthia 
Deneholz Sweeney, Comment, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: A Violation of 
Substantive Due Process?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1274 (1982) (discussing the 
individual's right to bodily security as part of the right to privacy). 
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the right had been read to. include "freedom from bodily restraint and 
punishment."183 The right of bodily integrity, like all constitutional 
rights of children, however, is not identical to an adult's right, nor is it 
absolute. 184 The Court has explained in other situations why it 
considers children's rights to be different from adults' rights. 185 The 
relevant reason applicable to the corporal punishment context is the need 
to respect the "parental role in child rearing."186 Two important 
interests are therefore at stake in these cases, and courts are left to 
determine how to strike the appropriate balance between them. 
The current test is deficient in balancing these interests in two 
respects. First, this test produces no consensus about where the line 
between reasonable and excessive force should be drawn. Individual 
decisionmakers will determine the scope of the parental right and will 
reach different conclusions about its parameters. The arbitrariness of 
their line-drawing leaves parents and the rest of society with little 
guidance about what level of force is appropriate. 187 This is particular-
ly troublesome because parents must raise their children on a daily basis, 
and therefore, must know the parameters within which they are working. 
Although the parameters of other fundamental rights, such as speech, 
also may be unresolved, the parental right of corporal punishment differs 
from those other areas in an important way. In the other areas, people 
can choose to take the risk of ambiguity, but parents need to know the 
exact scope of their right before acting. 
Second, even if courts can agree on where the line between reasonable 
and excessive force should be drawn, that consensus represents the 
consensus of people in power: parents. Adults determine the parameters 
of the right, and many of those adults are parents who may be acting out 
of self-interest when they de:fu;e the right. This test allows courts to 
183. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674 (citation omitted). 
184. See Developments, supra note 72, at 1358. 
185. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (discussing the constitutionality 
of a statute restricting minors' access to abortions); see also DA VIS & ScHW ARTZ, supra 
note 180, at 201 (stating that in some areas, the law accords a "measure of autonomy 
to children;" but in other areas, such as torts, the law "grants a measure of autonomy" 
to the parents because of the inherent conflict between the desire to give children greater 
control over their lives and the need to protect them from their surroundings). 
186. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. The other reasons advanced were the "peculiar 
vulnerability" of children and their diminished decisionmaking capacity. Id. 
187. But see State v. Singleton, 705 P.2d 825, 827 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (stating 
that the test for reasonableness of corporal punishment was not based on the subjective 
intent of the parent to discipline the child but was based objectively on all of the 
circumstances); Joan L. Neisser, School Officials: Parents or Protectors? The 
Contribution of a Feminist Perspective, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1507, 1523 (1993) ("[A]n 
educator is held to an objective standard of care-whether a reasonable person would 
have considered the punishment appropriate."). 
36 
[VOL. 32: 1, 1995] Parental Corporal Punishment 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
ignore the voices of children, a politically isolated minority, whose 
interests are strongly implicated in the definition of reasonable corporal 
punishment. In balancing the interests of parent and child under the 
current test, courts are free to disregard the interests of those most in 
need of their protection: children. 
B. The Proposed Test 
In response to these flaws in the current test, courts should consider 
adopting a new test to determine the scope of reasonable parental 
corporal punishment. Courts should ask parents a series of five 
questions to evaluate the reasonableness of their conduct. The five 
questions direct the parents to review their decision to use corporal 
punishment. They ask: (1) What was your intent in administering the 
corporal punishment? (2) To what were you responding? (3) What did 
you do? (4) Could the corporal punishment have worked? (5) Did you 
have any alternatives? 
This proposed test incorporates some elements of the current standard, 
but it refines those elements and introduces new ones. Like the current 
approach, this test looks at the parents' intent in administering the 
corporal punishment and the nature of the parents' conduct, but the 
similarities end there. This new test imposes heavier burdens on parents 
in assessing their intent and conduct than the criteria of the current test. 
For example, the Model Penal Code, the current standard that has been 
codified by many states, sets broad parameters to determine the 
reasonableness of the corporal punishinent. 188 Under that standard, the 
use of force is reasonable if two requirements are met. First, the 
purpose of the force must be to "safeguard[] or promot[ e] the welfare of 
the minor, including the prevention or punishment of his miscon-
duct."189 Second, the force is reasonable if it is not "designed to cause 
or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily 
harm, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degrada-
tion."190 This test does not give judges much deference: it may not be 
that judges cannot be sensitive to children, but that this standard will not 
188. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.08 (1985); see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.§ 703-309 
(Supp. 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 509 (1983). 
189. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.08(1)(a) (1985). 
190. Id. § 3.08(1)(b). 
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allow them to be sensitive. In contrast, the new test does not tie the 
judge's hands against the child. Furthermore, the proposed standard 
includes three new elements that courts must consider: the situation that 
provoked the parental use of force; the availability of alternatives other 
than the use of force; and the effectiveness of the use of force. 
The main advantage of this new test is its heightened sensitivity to the 
interests of children. This new test acknowledges that children's 
interests were not well-served in the recognition of a parental right to 
corporal punishment----especially a right that allows anything short of 
serious bodily injury. Standards such as the Model Penal Code are 
adopted by state legislatures even though they are adverse to children's 
interests because parents control the political process which establishes 
their right of corporal punishment. The only remaining way to preserve 
children's interests is to give them a voice in defining the scope of that 
right. The current test does not guarantee children that voice because it 
gives courts the latitude to define the right in ways that ignore children's 
interests and consider only the parents' rights. Although the new test 
has some subjectivity, it does not obstruct the judge from seeking to 
protect children from excessive corporal punishment. Therefore, this 
proposed test still balances the interests of parents and children, but it 
resolves them in favor of children's interests. 
Under the proposed test, courts must scrutinize every aspect of the 
parents' decision to use corporal punishment before approving it. The 
test imposes certain limits on parental force, and exceeding those limits 
automatically invalidates the use of corporal punishment. To take an 
extreme example, a parent cannot discipline or educate a child by 
electrocuting him under any circumstances. In that situation, a court 
does not need to consider the nature of the punishment in light of any 
of the other factors, including the parent's intent, the circumstances 
leading up to the electrocution, the effectiveness of the force, and any 
alternatives to electrocution. Because the factors are interrelated, 
however, courts will balance them in other situations to determine the 
reasonableness of the force. For example, the intensity of the force 
permitted might vary depending on the severity of the situation: a parent 
can use more force on a child who traps a sibling in the laundry chute 
than on a child who disobeys a parent and plays outside in the mud. 
Thus, courts have a certain amount of discretion in determining what 
constitutes reasonable corporal punishment, but in exercising that 
discretion, they must first and foremost consider children's interests. 
The first question in the new test, which requires courts to consider 
the parents' intent in administering corporal punishment, is similar but 
not identical to the current approach. The subtle but significant 
difference between the approaches highlights the proposed standard's 
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increased sensitivity to the interests of children. Under the current 
approach, many states have codified the Model Penal Code test for 
intent.191 This test provides that corporal punishment is justified if a 
parent is acting "for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the 
welfare of the minor, including the prevention or punishment of his 
misconduct. "192 
In Boland v. Leska, 193 the Pennsylvania Superior Court relied on a 
state statute which codified the Model Penal Code standard and held that 
a step-father did not act with "malicious intent" when he administered 
corporal punishment twice to his step-son. 194 The court determined 
that the step-father was not trying to injure the child; he simply wanted 
to show the child that he was angry and to discipline the child.195 
Thus, the court concluded that it found no evidence that the step-father's 
motives were "improper."196 Under the proposed standard for intent, 
however, a court should reach the opposite conclusion. The fact that the 
step-father was trying to show the child that he was angry, even though 
he did not want to hurt the child, would be sufficient evidence of an 
"improper" parental motive. A court would conclude that the step-father 
was acting, at least in part, for his own purposes, and therefore, did not 
have the appropriate intent to make the use of force justifiable. 
The new test would require courts to distinguish between parents who 
use corporal punishment to educate or discipline their children and those 
who use it to express their anger or to humiliate or hurt their chil-
dren. 197 Parents who fall into the first category are using physical 
force to teach their children lessons about how to behave. For example, 
a parent who slaps a child because the child is misbehaving in a public 
place has the appropriate intent if the purpose of the slap is either to 
communicate to the child that the behavior is unacceptable or to control 
191. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(l)(a) (1985). 
192. Id. 
193. 454 A.2d 75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
194. Id. at 78. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. One possible objection is that this proposed standard for intent is too difficult 
to apply because it requires courts to isolate the parents' intent in administering the 
punishment. Courts would be required to distinguish between parental intent to educate 
or discipline and intent that expresses parental anger or frustration with the child. A 
response to this objection is that courts are well-equipped to determine parental intent 
and have not found it difficult to ascertain in past cases. See id. 
39 
the child's conduct. In contrast, parents in the second category do not 
use physical force out of concern for their child's welfare; instead, they 
are administering corporal punishment to express feelings of anger or 
frustration toward a child. The mixed parental motive tolerated by the 
Boland court under the current test does not take into account the child's 
needs. In contrast, the new test requires that the parental intent behind 
corporal punishment serve the child's interests rather than indulge the 
parent's urges. 
The second and third questions should be considered together because 
they address related issues. These questions ask the parents to consider 
to what were they responding when they administered the corporal 
punishment and whether this use of force was consistent with the 
behavior to which they responded. The current test does not require that 
the parent's use of corporal punishment bear any relation to the child's 
behavior, 198 but the new test correlates the two sets of behavior. 
Under the new test, courts must balance the child's behavior against the 
nature of the corporal punishment: the less severe the child's miscon-
duct, the less appropriate it is to use corporal punishment to educate or 
discipline the child. This factor improves on the old test because it 
requires parents to justify their decision to use corporal punishment, and 
it permits reasonable corporal punishment only in cases of severe 
misbehavior. 199 Thus, the new test preserves children's rights to 
bodily security in situations where those interests formerly received no 
protection. 
In Boland, for example, a court evaluating the parent's use of force 
under the new test might have reached a different conclusion from the 
one reached by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.200 The court· deter-
mined that a step-father was taking appropriate "disciplinary measures" 
when he grabbed his step-child and left neck bruises in one instance and 
slapped the child on the face in another.201 The court concluded that 
these uses of force were reasonable, in part, because they "closely 
followed errant behavior by the child."202 The child's "errant behav-
198. See Andrea Monsees, The Sometimes-Person: Legal Autonomy and the Child, 
6 Ohio N.U. L. REV. 570, 579-80 (1979). This author found that "[t]here is no 
requirement that the degree of punishment chosen by a parent be commensurate with the 
act of the child." Id. at 579. She further stated that "[a] minor need not do anything 
morally, legally, or ethically improper to be disciplined." Id. at 580. 
199. This new test suggests that there are certain behaviors of childreri that cannot 
justify corporal punishment. See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying discussion of 
Boland v. Leska. 
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ior" consisted of losing a sweater in the first instance and not responding 
to his mother's questions about a missing item the second time.203 
Under the new standard, that behavior would not be considered severe 
enough to warrant blows to the head leaving bruises. The incidents were 
not severe because at least one, losing the sweater, was probably an 
innocent mistake, and both were isolated and unrelated. Thus, a court 
applying this new test could conclude that the parent had overreacted to 
the child's minor infractions when he administered corporal punishment. 
This new test, however, does not always sacrifice parental interests in 
favor of children's rights. The application of the second and third 
questions to a recent example of corporal punishment demonstrates how 
the test protects parents who administer corporal punishment to help 
their children. That situation involved a couple's decision to chain their 
teenage daughter to the radiator to prevent her from roaming the streets 
in search of drugs.204 In 1991, Eliezer and Maria Marrero were 
arrested and charged with unlawful imprisonment and endangering the 
welfare of their fifteen-year-old daughter, Linda.205 For two months, 
the couple had chained Linda to a radiator in their Bronx, New York, 
apartment at night to prevent her from going out in search of drugs.206 
They took this drastic action immediately after two drug dealers came 
to their apartment holding Linda at gunpoint and threatening to kill her 
because she owed them money.207 Their action also followed years of 
unsuccessful efforts to get their daughter help through social service 
agencies. After Linda became addicted to crack and began to roam the 
city searching for drugs, her parents approached the Child Welfare 
Administration, the police, Family Court, and a group home seeking 
assistance in taking care of their daughter.208 When no government 
official responded, the Marreros sent Linda, who still drank from a baby 
bottle, to Puerto Rico to live with relatives, but the relatives sent her 
203. Id. 
204. Case Dropped in Chaining, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at B3. 
205. Id. 
206. David Gonzalez, Behind Girl's Chaining, Siren Call of the Streets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at Al. 
207. Id. at B6. 
208. Id.; see also John T. McQuiston, Girl Chained by Parents Says She Wants to 
Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at Bl, B4 ("When I asked for help, they 
wouldn't take me .... That's an injustice."). 
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back home because they could not control her.209 As Linda's depar-
tures from home lengthened and her drug use escalated, her parents 
chained her by the left ankle to a radiator. They placed her in front of 
a television, a VCR, a stereo, and video games.210 Mrs. Marrero 
reflected on the situation: "I only had her chained for two months .... 
There was nothing else for me to do. We are not criminals. We are just 
people and we have the right to live."211 The charges against the 
Marreros were soon dropped, and the family moved out of New York 
City.212 Linda spent two years· in a drug rehabilitation facility and then 
left the facility, against her counselors' advice, to live with her family. 
A month after she returned to her parents, she was charged with 
assaulting another student at the school she was attending.213 
In answering the second question, a court would conclude that the 
Marreros were responding to far more serious misbehavior than the 
child's conduct in Boland.214 Therefore, the events leading up to the 
Marreros' confinement of Linda justified their use of corporal punish-
ment. Unlike the child who barely misbehaved in Boland, Linda was 
out of control. Linda's inability to take care of herself was the primary 
reason behind the Marreros' action?15 In the same way that parents 
do not allow their young children to wander alone outside because they 
cannot take care of themselves, so too did Linda's parents seek to 
prevent their daughter from going out alone because she could get hurt. 
Linda's past behavior demonstrated that she was not capable of 
controlling her own conduct: she used to leave home in search of drugs, 
and she would resort to any measures to get them. The nature, duration, 
and frequency of Linda's misconduct all contributed to the severity of 
the situation. From the age of twelve, Linda roamed the streets iri search 
of drugs; she often would return home battered and disheveled.216 
Furthermore, Linda had been disappearing for over three years. She was 
leaving more often and for longer amounts of time and was becoming 
more dependent on drugs.217 In addition to responding to Linda's 
long-standing pattern of disappearances into the street, the Marreros were 
209. Gonzalez, supra note 206, at B6. 
210. Id. 
211. McQuiston, supra note 208, at Bl, B4. 
212. Evelyn Nieves, A Troubled Daughter Returns, Followed by Torment: Addict 
Whose Parents Kept Her in Chains is Welcomed Home-and Then Arrested, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1994, § 1, at 21. 
213. Id. 
214. Boland v. Leska, 454 A.2d 75, 78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
215. See McQuiston, supra note 208, at Bl. 
216. Gonzalez, supra note 206, at Al; McQuiston, supra note 208, at Bl. 
217. Gonzalez, supra note 206, at Al. 
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confronting the more immediate problem of drug dealers' death threats 
toward their daughter.218 In sum, the severity of Linda's drug habit, 
as evidenced by the desperate measures she took to get drugs, the length 
of her addiction, and her increased absences from home, help to explain 
why the Marreros took the steps that they did. The Marreros did not 
confine Linda because they wanted to punish her for getting beaten up; 
rather, they were trying to alter her behavior. The parents responded to 
their daughter's needs with strong measures because they were trying to 
save her life. 
Turning to the third question, a court would conclude that the use of 
force was consistent with the behavior to which it responded. The 
Marreros' decision to chain their daughter inside the apartment may have 
represented a unique response to the situation, but this use of force was 
not excessive. The length of the punishment and the instrument used 
only seem extreme when considered in isolation and not in the context 
of the entire situation. During the day, Linda was allowed to wander 
around the family's apartment.219 When she was chained at night, she 
had a television, video games, and a stereo to occupy her, and she slept 
on a hideaway bed.220 Although her confinement lasted for two 
months, Linda had frequent visitors and was allowed to leave the 
apartment during the day in the company of another family member or 
friend.221 A chain might not be considered a typical instrument of 
corporal punishment; however, the Marreros used it to prevent Linda 
from being hurt, not to hurt her. Moreover, Linda suffered no physical 
or emotional injuries from being chained In fact, she professed that she 
"loved her parents, wanted to be back home and understood why they 
had disciplined her."222 Therefore, the amount of time that she was 
confined, the instrument used, and the absence of injury indicate that the 
nature of the force used on Linda was reasonable. 
The fourth question asks whether the corporal punishment could have 
worked in the particular situation where it was used. Some people will 
criticize this question as being too result-oriented. They will argue that 




221. Id.; see also Seth Faison, Jr., Teen-Age Girl Found Chained in Bronx 
Residence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, § 1, at 35. 
222. McQuiston, supra note 208, at B 1. 
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looking at its consequences. Raising children is not a utilitarian 
operation so parents should not be able to justify the use of force by 
saying: "If it worked, then it is automatically good." The fourth factor, 
however, does not endorse this approach; rather, it says the opposite: "If 
corporal punishment could not have worked, then it is automatically 
bad." Therefore, an affirmative answer to this question does not mean 
that the parental use of force was reasonable. Courts would continue to 
determine reasonableness based on all of the factors in the test. 
One might argue that it is not always clear what it means for 
something to work. Courts should define that concept to include cases 
in which the use of physical force brings about even a temporary 
improvement in the situation. This definition is best because it allows 
parents to use corporal punishment as a tool of education and discipline. 
If the use of physical force does not enable parents to teach or discipline 
their children, then it does not work, and parents would concede that 
there is no need to protect their right to administer it. Moreover, this 
definition is easy to apply because it gives courts an objective way to 
evaluate the success of the corporal punishment. Courts can simply look 
to outward manifestations of behavioral changes in the child to 
determine whether the corporal punishment worked. Those manifesta-
tions take the form of the child stopping or starting certain conduct or 
somehow altering the behavior that got him or her into trouble. An 
example shows how easy it is to apply this definition. If a child is 
going to electrocute his sibling, the parent slaps the child's hand to get 
him to drop the cord. The corporal punishment has worked because 
slapping the child's hand caused him to stop the behavior which got him 
into trouble. The parent does not have to work on long-term behavior 
modification techniques to determine if the corporal punishment worked. 
The immediate, short-term effect is sufficient to establish that the use of 
force worked. 
The strengths of this definition of the concept of working are apparent 
when it is applied to the Marreros' use of corporal punishment on Linda. 
The parents' chaining their daughter inside the apartment worked 
because it brought about at least a temporary improvement in the 
situation. The parents' decision to confine Linda temporarily improved 
the situation because it safeguarded Linda's welfare at a dangerous time 
in her life. The corporal punishment temporarily secured Linda's 
welfare because it kept her off of the streets for two months, away from 
drugs and drug dealers who had threatened her. Her confinement to the 
apartment improved the situation because she stopped using drugs during 
that period. In addition, the publicity surrounding her parents' decision 
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to chain her led to her being placed in a residential treatment pro-
gram.223 Admittedly, the Marreros' actions did not permanently 
safeguard her welfare because she disappeared back onto the street both 
immediately224 after her parents took off the chains and later after she 
was released from the residential treatment facility.225 However, even 
though the corporal punishment did not permanently secure her welfare, 
the corporal punishment worked because it improved Linda's behavior 
during the time it was implemented and guaranteed her safety while it 
was in effect. 
This definition of what it means for corporal punishment to work 
should be used instead of alternative meanings. For example, courts 
should reject a definition that requires them to :figure out if the corporal 
punishment has led the child to develop the internal controls he needs 
to stop engaging permanently in certain behavior. Although society may 
want corporal punishment to bring about long-term behavioral modifica-
tion in a child, this definition is too ambiguous and subjective to be 
applied consistently. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for courts 
to assess the effectiveness of the corporal punishment on that level. 
Courts would have to ascertain the child's state of mind to decide if he 
or she had developed those internal controls, and that assessment is 
beyond the courts' expertise. Moreover, this process would draw courts 
into developing their own standards for evaluating the child's state of 
mind. Those standards will vary based on the decisionmaker. Further, 
they are based on the kinds of value judgments better left for the 
legislature to make. 
When that definition is applied to the Marrero situation, the issue 
becomes whether the corporal punishment led Linda to develop internal 
controls to permanently stop her self-destructive search for drugs. It is 
obvious that the corporal punishment did not have that effect in Linda's 
case. The definition asks a court to measure the long-term effectiveness 
of corporal punishment at the time of trial, and it is impossible to predict 
with certainty whether the corporal punishment will deter Linda from 
returning to her old habits in the future. Furthermore, that definition 
asks too much of parents. It demands that the temporary process of 
administering corporal punishment guarantee permanent results. This 
223. Nieves, supra note 212, § 1, at 24. 
224. Gonzalez, supra note 206, at B6. 
225. Nieves, supra note 212, § 1, at 24. 
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definition effectively deprives parents, such as the Marreros, of a short-
term solution to an immediate need and for which there may be no long-
term answer. 
An affirmative answer to the question of whether the corporal 
punishment works does not necessarily mean that the court will find the 
parental behavior reasonable. However, a negative answer does mean 
that the court will find the parental behavior unreasonable. Thus, a 
judicial determination that corporal punishment improves the situation, 
even temporarily, allows the court to consider the reasonableness of the 
force under the other parts of the test. 
The fifth question asks whether the parents had any alternatives to 
administering corporal punishment. This factor imposes an additional 
burden on parents because they must consider other options before using 
physical force to discipline their children. Under this standard, parents 
cannot administer corporal punishment to children if other less restrictive 
forms of discipline are available. Corporal punishment should be 
considered a more extreme form of discipline than other methods,226 
such as taking privileges away from a child or simply talking to a child 
about his misbehavior. It is more extreme because corporal punishment 
teaches children that the use of physical force is an appropriate response 
to a situation.227 Society punishes this use of force outside the parent-
child situation228 so parental corporal punishment of children sends the 
message that conduct not tolerated elsewhere is acceptable in this 
context. The state cannot use physical force on adults in its custody if 
it has alternative ways of exercising control over them. Similarly, 
parents should not be able to use physical force on their children if they 
have other less restrictive ways of exercising control over them. 
Because the use of physical force is more onerous than other parental 
actions and not tolerated in other contexts, parents should only employ 
it if other less burdensome alternatives are not available to them. 
226. See, e.g., FACT SHEET, supra note 130, at 1 (discussing arguments against and 
alternatives to corporal punishment in the public schools). 
227. Children who are abused are more likely to abuse others. This cycle of 
violence means that parental use of corporal punishment will carry over from one 
generation to another. See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 
SYNDROME 18-20 (1984) (noting that battering is a learned behavior that arises from 
being abused as a child); CYNTHIA CROSSON TOWER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT 423 (2d ed. 1993) (suggesting that victims of abuse at a young age may 
feel a need to "reconstruct the patterns of their childhoods" as a result of a feeling of 
powerlessness). 
228. Many states ban the use of corporal punishment on prisoners. See, e.g., 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 31 (West 1993) (stating that it is "unlawful for any person 
to administer any corporal punishment of any kind to any inmate"). In addition, criminal 
assault and battery statutes prohibit the kind of force tolerated in the form of corporal 
punishment. 
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A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Hawaii underscores the 
importance of considering alternatives to corporal punishment in 
deciding the reasonableness of the parental use of force.229 In Hawaii 
v. DeLeon, the court relied on a state statute that codified the Model 
Penal Code standard for reasonable force when it determined that a 
father's use of force against his teen-age daughter was not excessive.230 
The father decided to administer the punishment after he had told his 
daughter repeatedly that she could not invite her friends over to the 
house because they were a "bad in:fluence."231 After she continued to 
do so, he further informed her that her continued disobedience would 
result in her being "spank[ed] ... with a belt."232 The relevant statute 
prohibited force "designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk 
of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or 
mental distress, or gross degradation."233 The Supreme Court of 
Hawaii overturned the trial court's ruling and determined that the father 
did not inflict "extreme pain" on his daughter.234 According to the 
court, the father's initial conduct did not violate the statute when he hit 
his daughter between six and ten times on the thighs with a belt, causing 
pain that lasted for an hour and a half, bruises that remained for one 
week, and a trip to the emergency room.235 Furthermore, the court 
decided that the father had not caused his daughter "gross degradation" 
when he later cut her waist-length hair up to her neck.236 
Under the new test, the DeLeon court would have to consider the 
father's conduct in light of available alternatives and would reach a 
different result. The father did not s_uggest that his daughter could see 
her friends elsewhere; he did not "ground" her from going out; and he 
did not threaten to take away any other privileges if she disobeyed his 
orders. Instead, when his daughter broke the "house rules," the father 
immediately resorted to severe, physical force. He first hit his daughter 
so hard and so often that the police who were called to the scene 
believed she needed medical attention, and then he cut off her hair. This 
229. Hawaii v. DeLeon, 813 P.2d 1382, 1383 (Haw. 1991). 
230. Id. at 1383-84. 







parental failure to try other less restrictive forms of discipline before 
turning to physical force would make the father's conduct in DeLeon 
excessive under the new test. 
The requirement that parents must consider alternatives to corporal 
punishment does not always favor children's interests over parents' 
needs. Sometimes parents attempt alternative ways of disciplining or 
educating their children, and the failure of these efforts underscores the 
need to uphold their right of corporal punishment. Courts should assess 
the reasonableness of the corporal punishment in light of the alternatives 
available to the parents. In cases where parents have no alternatives to 
using corporal punishment, courts should preserve that parental right. 
This is particularly true if the state has played a role in depriving parents 
of alternative ways of disciplining or educating their children. When the 
state deprives parents of effective ways of controlling their children, it 
should give them some other way to achieve the same ends. For 
example, if the state has refused to make parenting classes, counseling, 
or other services available to parents to help them cope with the 
demands of parenthood, then it should not be able to take away their 
only remaining effective tool of discipline: corporal punishment. 
The Marreros' plight illustrates this problem. There, the state failed 
to provide parents with workable alternatives to corporal punishment and 
then penalized them when they turned to physical force as a last resort. 
For almost three years, the couple struggled to figure out a way to keep 
Linda off of the streets.237 The Marreros sought help from family and 
friends and sent Linda to live in Puerto Rico, but no one could control 
her.238 The family could not afford to pay for private drug treatment 
so they turned to the state for assistance.239 Mrs. Marrero approached 
the Child Welfare Administration, the Family Court, and the police in 
search of someone to take custody of her daughter.240 All of them 
refused and left the Marreros with the responsibility of taking care of 
Linda. When the Marreros tried to fulfill that responsibility by doing the 
only thing they thought would work,241 the state intervened and told 
237. Gonzalez, supra note 206, at Al. 
238. Id. at B6. 
239. See Nieves, supra note 212, §1, at 21. 
240. Gonzalez, supra note 206, at Al. 
241. Newman, supra note 154, § 4, at 12 ("[T]ime and again, Linda continued to 
run away, and her parents felt that no one had a solution."); Nieves, supra note 212, 
§ 1, at 21 ("[The Marreros] had no way to help her, they said, and did not know what 
else to do with a daughter who had been running wild for years."); Gonzalez, supra 
note 206, at B6 ("'It was the only way [Mr. Marrero] had to get her to abandon those 
vices"') (quoting a neighbor of the Marreros). 
48 
(VOL. 32: 1, 1995] Parental Corporal Punishment 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
them. that they had exceeded the scope of their parental authority.242 
Even though the Marreros' use of physical force was the only thing that 
kept their daughter off of the streets and away from. drugs, the state 
arrested them. for endangering Linda's welfare. A public policy expert 
com.m.ented on the Marreros' dilem.m.a: 
The parents in this situation were absolutely at a loss for how they would 
accomplish what society and what they themselves wanted for their child . . .. 
Because no matter how much others try to say parents are to blame, they are 
not giving them the tools to figure out the question of how to convince a child 
not to do drugs. 243 
The state conveyed a mixed message to the Marreros when it told them. 
simultaneously not.to chain Linda at hom.e but to keep her safe and off 
the streets.244 When the parents tried to protect their daughter the only 
way they knew how, the state punished their efforts for being too 
extreme. The state should not be able to take away the Marreros' only 
means of safeguarding their daughter's welfare without putting 
something in its place. When the state chose not to help Linda, it also 
lost the power to dictate how others might help her.245 
Courts m.ay be reluctant to sift through alternatives to corporal 
punishment and weigh them. to determine the reasonableness of. the use 
of force. This reluctance could be based on the subjective nature of 
242. Faison, supra note 221, § I, at 35. 
243. Newman, supra note 154, § 4, at 12 (quoting Peter W. Forsythe, Vice-
President, Edna McConnell Clark Foundation). 
244. Id. Peter W. Forsythe, Vice-President of the Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation and a public policy expert, has commented on the state's conflicting 
expectations of parents: "We're giving parents a mixed message . . . . We're saying 
to them, 'We don't like the way you're disciplining your children, but we want you to 
control them better."' Id. 
245. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 
(1989), the Supreme Court considered whether a county social services agency was liable 
under the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to protect a child from his father's repeated 
beatings. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist determined that the agency was not 
liable because it had failed to act and had not entered into a special relationship with the 
child that would give rise to an affirmative duty to act. Id. at 194-95. In dissent, 
however, Justice Brennan wrote that the state had acted when it directed others to report 
child abuse to the social services agency, received and investigated reports of abuse of 
this child, failed to remove the child from his father's custody, and then represented that 
it had taken care of the problem. Id. at 208-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to 
Justice Brennan, the state must do the job right once it agrees to do it. Id. at 210. 
Similarly, the state must provide parents with alternatives to corporal punishment once 
it decides to restrict their use of physical force. 
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these determinations. Courts would be second-guessing parental 
decisions to use force which may be made quickly and without 
awareness of other options. In so doing, courts would be substituting 
the values of individual decisionmakers for parents' values. For 
example, a judge might believe that a parent had not thoroughly 
explored alternatives to corporal punishment, while the parent had not 
even thought of these options or had considered and discarded them in 
light of superior knowledge about what works with that child. 
There are two responses to this concern. First, courts are equipped to 
evaluate the parental decision to use force in light of available alterna-
tives. Courts have the job of determining the reasonableness of 
individuals' conduct on a daily basis, and they are in the best position 
to consider the parental use of force under all of the circumstances. 
Judges and juries can draw on their own experiences to assess the 
availability of less restrictive forms of punishment, and they should be 
encouraged to do so. The availability of alternatives is simply one factor 
in this balancing test. The weight of this factor probably would be 
affected by how apparent the option was and how long the parent had 
to think. Second, this factor ensures that courts will weigh the interests 
of children in the balancing test. Children have an interest in being kept 
safe from physical harm, and the requirement that courts consider the 
parental use of force in light of less restrictive alternatives narrowly 
circumscribes the scope of the parental right. Thus, the parameters of 
the parental right of corporal punishment are limited to protect children's 
rights to bodily integrity. 
In sum, this five-part test gives courts, parents, and children a helpful 
way to determine the reasonableness of the parental use of corporal 
punishment. Because the political process safeguards the parental ability 
to use corporal punishment, children do not have a voice in determining 
whether a right should be recognized. That decision has already been 
made for them. The only place where their voices can be heard is in 
determining the scope of reasonable corporal punishment, and this new 
test gives them that opportunity. 
This new test is more sensitive to the needs of children than the 
current standard is in several ways. First, it requires parents to search 
for less restrictive alternatives to corporal punishment before using 
physical force on their children. Therefore, parents must tum to corporal 
punishment only as a last resort. Corporal punishment is not the 
preferred means of discipline or education, but it is tolerated if there are 
no available alternatives. Furthermore, this test evaluates the nature of 
the physical force in light of the situation that precipitated that force and 
requires a correlation between the two. Using this approach, the parental 
use of force may be unreasonable if the circumstances do not justify it. 
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Finally, this test is attentive to children's needs without sacrificing 
parents' interests. This concern for parental rights can be seen in the 
application of this test to the Marreros' situation. In that situation, a 
court adopting this new test should conclude that the parental use of 
force was reasonable because the parents were responding to a life-or-
death situation and had exhausted alternative forms of discipline. 
Parents do not bear the exclusive responsibility for providing those 
alternatives; the state should assist parents, such as the Marreros, who 
ask for help when they cannot control their children. When the state 
refuses to help, it cannot restrict the parents' ability to use corporal 
punishment. The test thus balances the interests of parents and children 
in a way that is sensitive to the needs of both groups. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should not recognize a fundamental right of 
parental corporal punishment. The Court cannot locate a source that 
establishes such a right, and it should reserve that heightened constitu-
tional protection for interests that cannot be safeguarded by the political 
process. Because the political process adequately preserves parents' 
ability to administer reasonable corporal punishment, courts should tum 
their attention to protecting the interests of the politically isolated 
minority--children. Courts can secure the interests of children in the 
way that they define the parameters of reasonable corporal punishment. 
The current test that courts use to draw the line between reasonable and 
excessive force represents parents' interests at the expense of children's 
rights. In contrast, the test proposed in this Article is sensitive to the 
needs of children. The test requires courts to resolve all doubts in favor 
of children and only permits corporal punishment if parents do not have 
less restrictive alternatives available. Thus, this test admits the reality 
of parental use of corporal punishment, but within that reality, seeks to 
protect the interests of children. 
51 

